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The beginning hours of 1994 rang in both the New Year and the Zapatista
uprising in Chiapas. Although in existence since 1983, the Zapatista movement was
relatively unknown to the rest of the world until Subcomandante Marcos' propaganda
offensive against the Mexican government. Steeped in historical references to indigenous
exploitation and Emiliano Zapata, the Zapatista's call to arms and governmental
reformation has continued to make effective use of symbols and rituals, reshaping the
images of Indianness and economic suffering within Chiapas. The organization continues
to garner support abroad as well as within Mexico through the use of the Internet, public
media and effective appropriation of nationalist symbols. What marks the Zapatista
rebellion as extraordinary is its emergence as one ofthe first information age insurgencies
to make such efficient use of these mediums.
This study presents a framework for analyzing propaganda, drawing from the
fields of symbolic politics, cultural anthropology, and marketing. This symbolic frame is
then applied to the Zapatistas in order to better understand the entire movement. The
propaganda goals of the organization are examined, specifically addressing the areas of
legitimacy, member unification, support both outside and within Mexico, recruitment, and
challenges presented to the government.
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I. SOWING THE SEEDS: AN INTRODUCTION
A. CONTEXT
At precisely thirty minutes into the New Year of 1994 an army of young and
mostly indigenous 1 men and women uniformed in rubber boots, camouflaged pants, red
bandanas, and ski masks, seized town halls in seven municipalities in eastern and central
Chiapas. Poorly armed with a motley array of weapons ranging from UZIs and AK-15s
to sledgehammers and axes (many even had wooden rifles), they declared war on the
military and the government. On this day, the inauguration of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Zapatistas declared "j/foy decimos bastal" ["Today we
say enough is enough!"]2 and, invoking Article 39 of Mexico's 1917 Constitution which
invests national sovereignty and the right to change the government in the people, called
on their "Mexican brothers" to help depose the "illegal dictatorship" of President Salinas
de Gortari. The spokesman and military strategist for the Zapatistas, Subcomandante
Marcos, was quite clear about the demands of the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation
National (EZLN). Beginning on the second day of the uprising, they held press
1 The terms "Indian" and "indigenous" are used interchangeably when referring to those people and
communities defined by the United Nations Sub-Commissioin on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities as follows: "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having
a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories,
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop,
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
own continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own culturall patterns, social institutions and
legal systems." From Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, United
Nations Document E/Cn.4/Sub.2/1 986/7Add.4, para.379, 1968, as cited in Donna Lee Van Cott, Defiant
Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American Security, McNair Paper, no.53, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1996.
2
For full text translated into English of their Declaracion de la Selva Lacondona ("Declaration from the
Lacondona Jungle") see Shadows of Tender Fury: The Letters and Communiques of Subcomandante
conferences and emphasized agrarian reform as central to their list of demands: work,
land, housing, nutrition, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, and
justice, as well as their "Laws ofWomen".
Twelve days later, more than 100,000 citizens marched into the city square of
Mexico City chanting, "Primer Mundo, jJd Jd Jdl ["First World, Ha Ha Ha!"] in open
defiance of the government's economic alliances with "developed" countries to the North
and claim that Mexico was on the way to becoming a First World country. Bowing to
this pressure, Salinas ordered his military to a cease-fire and sent a representative to
negotiate with the EZLN, assisted by a Zapatista-approved mediator, Bishop Samuel
Ruiz Garcia. One Mexican writer quips, "the Zapatistas achieved in eleven days what the
FMLN [Farabundo Martin National Liberation Front, a former guerrilla organization in
El Salvador] was unable to in eleven years." In other words, he continues, they were able
...to determine the terms of the cease-fire, to force the government to sit
and negotiate in their own territory, to introduce into the spectrum of
Mexican political forces a new vision of the future of the country, and
above all, to create a new political mythology in a time when most
political mythologies are bankrupt,
4
The Zapatista's influence did not stop here. The July 1997 mid-term
congressional elections in Mexico resulted in the first major break in nearly 70 years of
control by the Institutional Ruling Party (PRI). Cuauhtemoc Cardenas of the leftist
opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) won the mayoral elections in
Mexico City, while the PRD, the National Action Party (PAN), and two smaller parties
Marcos and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation by Marcos, Leslie Lopez (translator), Frank
Bardacke, and Joh Ross, Monthly Review Press, 1995.
3
In general, these laws included the following rights and demands: no arranged marriages(without their
consent), availability of birth control, participation in the life of the community (to include holding political
office), and right to study. For full text, see "Revolutionary Women's Law" in Elaine Katzenberger, ed.,
First World, Ha Ha Ha!: The Zapatista Challenge, City Lights, 1995, pp. 109-1 10.
gained an 11 -vote majority in the 500-member Chamber of Deputies. 5 The Zapatista
spokesperson, Marcos, however, urged the Zapatistas to shun the voting because none of
the mainstream parties offered viable solutions to the country's problems.6 The
unprecedented political pluralism, nevertheless, was no doubt a result of the increased
societal awareness and refusal to accept the status quo, in part brought about by the
Zapatista movement. In effect, the citizens of Mexico joined together and cried jBasta!
as each cast his vote against business as usual in Mexican politics.
Steeped in historical references to indigenous exploitation and Emiliano Zapata's7
Mexican Revolution of the 1910s, the Zapatista's call to arms and governmental
reformation succeeded in not only mobilizing the peoples of Chiapas, but also uniting
various activist groups outside the country, most of whom had no direct contact or
knowledge of the Chiapas Indian movement prior to January 1994. The Zapatistas, with
Subcomandante Marcos orchestrating* became masters of symbols,, linking the past to the
present and the present to the future, through carefully managed use of the Internet and
public media. Their campaign achieved several notable results. They were able to (1)
4
Guillermo Gomez Pena, "The Subcomandante of Performance," in Katzenberger, pp.95-6.
5
Ricarado Sandoval, "Opposition Wins Big in Mexico, Victory: Cardenas Captures Powerful Post in
Capital City," San Jose Mercury News, 7 July 1997, p.lA, and "Outcomes Still Shifting from Mexico's
July 6 Vote," CNN Interactive, [http://cnn.com/ WORLD/americas/9708/06/RB001281.reuLhtml], 6
August 1997.
6
Additionally, Zapatistas and their supporters were credited with burning voting materials and destroying
polling stations, shutting down 84 polling booths in Chiapas. See Ricardo Sandoval, "Opposition Wins Big
in Mexico Victory: Cardenas Captures Powerful Post in Capital City," San Jose Mercury News, 1 July
1997, p. 1A.
7
Zapata was himself a Zapoteca Indian tenant fanner from the state of Morelos, to the west of Mexico
City, who gathered up an army of Indians in the 1910-1917 Mexican Revolution and led them in an effort
to regain expropriated Indian lands. He controlled large parts of southern Mexico and his Liberator Army
of the South occupied Mexico City three times in 1914-15, entering the first time in November 1914 with
the forces ofPancho Villa. After the revolution, he retired to Morelos and died after he was invited to lunch
with a former rival colonel and then shot dead. His murder is considered to be among the most treacherous
deeds in Mexican history. For more detail, see Ward Churchill, "A North American Indigenist View," in
Katzenberger, pp.141-155.
legitimize their organization and cause, (2) unify the seemingly diverse (in terms of
religion and race), (3) garner support from outside their country and culture as well as (4)
from Mexicans outside Chiapas, (5) recruit members, and (6) challenge the existing
power structure in Mexico,
B. SYMBOLS AND STRUGGLES
Although the question remains cloudy of whether the EZLN is a social
movement, a revolutionary socialist movement, or an Indian movement, one fact that is
clear is the phenomena of international support and sympathy. Three years later the
Zapatistas are still regarded as an organization with which to be reckoned. Their
campaign has directly influenced actions taken towards land reform by the Mexican
government as well as indirectly pressured other governments to address the Zapatista
grievances. RAND analyst David Ronfeldt observes that their struggle has indeed been
partially successful.
It helped oblige President Salinas in January 1994, and President Zedillo
in February 1995, to halt current military operations and turn to political
negotiations. It has added to the. pressures on Mexico's leaders to continue
enacting political and electoral reforms, and to take human rights
seriously.
To gain a better understanding of the Zapatista phenomenon, it is necessary to
reframe the rebellion and approach it from a different perspective. Attempts at symbolic
mobilization accompany every modern movement, "from the donning of simple military
tunics by the Russian and Chinese Communists, to the pagan glitter of the Fascist
8 David Ronfeldt, "The Battle for the Mind of Mexico," an email copy from author of the original version
in English of an article published in Spanish in Mexico, "Batallas Mexicanas en Internet," NEXOS,
December 1995, pp.47-52.
hierarchs, to. ..the scruffy beards of Latin American guerrilleros."9 Cultural symbols are
powerful tools to reach target audiences and, consequently, movement leaders frame their
collective actions around them, creating new meanings and connotations from the old
while wrapping them in social and political context.
The proper selection of particular symbols and themes is critical, however.
Symbols are not just reproduced unconsciously or unselectively, but require some action
and an infusion ofnew materials and meaning if they are to mobilize. As "consumers of
existing cultural meanings as well as producers of new ones," 10 they must focus on the
"intersection between a target population's culture and their own values and goals." 11 In
this way inherited symbols of a culture can be appropriated to fit the needs of the
rebellion, combined with new symbols that effectively reach the target audiences.
Using this concept of a symbolic frame to analyze the Zapatistas, it becomes
apparent that their success was largely due to their ability to appropriate nationalist
symbols as well as reshape the images of Indianness and economic suffering within
Chiapas (as compared to the rest of Mexico). Groups both outside Mexico as well as
non-Chiapas Mexicans could identify equally well with these new images, which
emphasized international indigenous oppression, women's rights, and Mexican
nationalism, focusing on Emiliano Zapata's fight for indigenous land rights as well as the
indigenous heritage of almost all Mexicans today. Using symbols that evoked such
images, with particular attention to liberal activist groups the world over, the Zapatistas
9 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, Cambridge





disseminated their images and messages globally, using World Wide Web pages on the
Internet, news media, and electronic newsgroups.
C. METHODOLOGY
Primary to their success, the Zapatista's have been able to successfully select and
incorporate symbols which appeal to outside groups. By appealing to the non-indigenous
Mexicans and to the international community, the Zapatistas have been able to rouse both
domestic and international support. By selecting those symbols which addressed
vulnerabilities or susceptibilities within each group, the Zapatistas were able to reach out
using these symbols and create a means for the target audiences to identify with and
support their own cause. At the same time, they were able to minimize the reach and
legitimacy of their adversaries' symbols.
This thesis will analyze the Zapatista rebellion using a symbolic frame. The
particular symbols and rituals used by the Zapatista to foment both domestic and
international support will be examined to determine how they are able to garner support
for their cause. Although emphasis will be placed on the early period of the uprising
(January through July of 1994), their campaign up to 1997 will also be addressed. The
basic principles of such disciplines as symbolic politics, political psychology, cultural
anthropology, and even marketing all contribute to this symbolic frame, which the
Zapatistas skillfully employed. Their efforts brought them a semblance of legitimacy, a
strongly united organization, support both outside and inside Mexico, aided in
recruitment, and presented a challenge to the government.
D. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
One of the first images presented by the Zapatistas appeared on the Internet in
1992. In the essay, entitled "Chiapas: the Southwest in Two Winds," Marcos describes
the problems of the Chiapas region and its exploitation by the government using the
images ofwinds to illustrate the impending clash of the people and those exploiting mem.
This image of the Zapatista storm is used in this thesis to outline the development of the
Zapatista's propaganda campaign and their clash of symbols.
The study of the storm begins with an introductory chapter that provides critical
background and context. Chapter II, The Winds of Change, follows with a brief
discussion of the origins of the current Zapatista movement, focusing on the economic
and social conditions in Chiapas leading up to the rebellion.
Chapter III, The Storm Brews, discusses symbols and rituals as used in rebellions
and insurgencies, in order to build a bridge between symbols and underground
movements. This bridge will then provide the framework for analyzing movements such
as the Zapatista uprising. Chapter IV, The Clouds Form, looks at how the economic and
social situation in Chiapas helped create susceptible groups that were vulnerable to the
Zapatistas. Other target audiences, their vulnerabilities, and the means of disseminating
the Zapatista's images and symbols are also presented in this chapter.
Chapter V, The Sky Darkens, discusses in much greater detail the symbols ofthe
Zapatista uprising. Both the Mayan roots and culture are reflected in many facets of the
organization, as well as the Mexican Revolution of 1910. How these symbols achieve
their ends (e.g., legitimacy) is analyzed, using the framework outlined in Chapter II.
The last chapter, The Rain Falls, presents the final analysis, as well as discusses
its applicability to other insurgent movements. Although many have described the
Zapatistas as the first modern insurgents (owing to their sophisticated use of the Internet
and public media), it is most assuredly not the last.
H. SEEDS OF CHANGE
A. GRIEVANCES
In his August 1992 essay, "Chiapas: the Southeast in Two Winds," Marcos
alludes to the conflict between the natural resource rich state and the marginalized groups
ofpeople who live there.
The storm is here. From the clash of these two
Winds the storm will be born, its time has
Arrived. Now the wind from above rules, but the
Wind from below is coming....
In order to understand the Zapatista rebellion, it is necessary to understand the
origins of the Zapatista's "storm," or, as one commentator phrased it, the Zapatista
"moment" in a social struggle of several decades in Mexico. 13 As a result of these
grievances, a situation arose that was ripe for rebellion, a situation that the Zapatistas
were able to effectively exploit.
Central to any successful insurgency is a popular support base and legitimate
grievances against the existing regime. There is evidence that those affiliated with the
organization do indeed have legitimate grievances against the Mexican government,
which in turn facilitated the growth of their popular support. A map depicting Chiapas as
well as the areas of greatest Zapatista support is shown in Figure 1.
12 Subcomandante Marcos, "Chiapas: The Southeast in Two Winds," [http://www.ezln.org/SE-in-two-
winds.html], 2 March 1997.
13
Carlos Montemayor, "Mexico: EZLN and EPR Reviewed Separately," FBIS-LAT-97-203, 28 June 1997.
Figure 1. Chiapas and the Areas of Zapatista Rebellion. From Collier, 3.
10
Stanford University anthropologist George Collier provides one of the most
complete analyses of the land reform issues and societal impacts of the changing
economy in Chiapas. This region, the natural resource center of Mexico, provides over
half of the hydroelectricity, 21 percent of the oil, 47 percent of the natural gas, and a third
of its coffee production (of which 68 percent is exported). 14 Despite this wealth of
resources, however, there is 25 percent illiteracy in the relatively privileged town of San
Cristobal and 71 percent illiteracy in the largely indigenous town of Chamula. 15 Thirty
percent of the region's population of 3.2 million is illiterate and half live without running
water or electricity. Alcoholism is rampant, as are parasitic diseases among children. 16
In Collier's words, Chiapas has become "almost an internal colony for the rest of
Mexico." 17 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this disparity.
B. CHANGING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
The economy of Chiapas and the changes brought about by the changing global
market, particularly the oil boom and bust, played a critical role. Prior to Mexico's 1982
debt crisis, there existed a mixed economy of timber, corn, coffee, and cattle. These all
suffered under the eventual removal of fertilizer subsidies, a 50% fall in world coffee
prices, drop in domestic price of corn, and the devaluation of the peso in 1976 and 1977.
As a result, peasants in the region lost their land, cattle, and other collateral to
foreclosures when they failed to make good on their loans taken out to finance their
14
Philip L. Russell, The Chiapas Rebellion, Mexico Resource Center, 1995, p. 12.
15
Ibid., p. 18.
16 George A. Collier and Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in
Chiapas, The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994, p. 16. For a good description of living












figure 2. Distribution of electricity among
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farms. Additionally, much of the land formerly rented to peasants had been converted
to grasslands for cattle (which only requires one percent as many people per hectare as
farming). Their labor requirements for the remaining fields were also significantly
decreased due to their access to chemicals such as pesticides and fertilizers, meaning less
work available for those most needing it.
As a result of these economic changes, a gap arose and widened between the rich
and poor, not only between the ladino and indigene? but also among the indigenous
people themselves. "Although all appear to be poor to the outside observer, there are in
fact townspeople who are wealthy by local standards, who have hitched their fate to the
dominant political party, and who thus have much to lose in an uprising which surely is at
least in part against them.''''
Additionally, differences arose due to religious faith. Of the approximately
30,000 Chamulas, 90 percent are evangelical Protestants, due to the efforts of the US
missionaries in the area, according to the Rutherford Institute, an international civil and
religious liberties organization based in Charlottesville, Virginia. The only common trait
among these newly created subcultures within a culture was their search for identity.
The situation only worsened as Salinas forced "the reform" of Article 27 of the
Constitution through Congress in 1992 at the urging of his advisors. Because they felt
that the productivity ofpeasant-held land used for crops was not competitive, they pushed
Collier and Quaratiello, Chapters IV and V, and Russell, Chapter 1.
Russell, p. 13.
20 Ladino is a term that refers to mestizos (ofmixed white and Indian parentage), people of purely European
descent, and genetic Indians who have chosen to "shed the cultural markers of being 'Indian'...who speak
Spanish instead of Nahuatl, wear shoes instead of sandals, call themselves Matos instead of Moctezuma,
move from their communal village to the capital city." Indigena, on the other hand, are genetic Indians
who maintain all their traditional customs and language. From Peter Winn, Americas: The Changing Face
ofLatin America and the Caribbean, University of California Press, 1995, pp.241 -242.
13
for the total elimination of market subsidies and the halt of all further land reform
(initially begun under the 1917 Constitution) in order to prevent additional land from
being absorbed into inefficient peasant production. They advocated privatization and
commercialization of peasant and Indian-held parcels, devastating to the already destitute
peasant and indigena, now further stripped of any potential to earn a livelihood or support
his family. This "effectively dashed the hopes of landless peasants of ever owning their
own small farm."
Finally, the specter of NAFTA weighed heavily on the region's farmers,
particularly corn growers, who feared that they would be overwhelmed by food imports
from the United States, depriving them their livelihoods,. Eduardo Pesquiera, Mexico's
representative to the Food and Agricultural Organization remarked, "In Mexico, corn is
more than a food. It is culture, religion, and national identity."24 It was no accident that
the New Year uprising took place on the inauguration of this trade agreement. In his first
communique, Marcos announced that NAFTA was "a death certificate for the indigenous
peoples of Mexico."25
But NAFTA was not the only "death certificate." The Indian communities were
traditionally close-knit, of one principal religion (an indigenous and Catholic hybrid), and
revolved around communal lands called ejidos. Their primary loyalty was to their
community and they most closely identified with their Mayan heritage. Loyalties and
class, however, were no longer defined along the lines of ethnicity after the introduction
21




Rosset, in Katzenberger, p. 164.
24
Russell, p. 17.
5 Gary MacEoin, The People's Church: Bishop Samuel Ruiz of Mexico and Why He Matters, The
Crossroads Publishing Company, 1996, p.94.
14
of government Indianist programs,26 a rising economic gap among Indians, and the
proliferation of evangelical and Catholic Liberation Theology converts. In effect, the
traditional social and economic structures of the region had, in many areas, completely
broken down, leaving a vacuum among the various groups.
The result was a situation which "contributed to the defection into the Zapatista
camp... In eastern Chiapas, which has no major commercial centers and is largely
inaccessible even by road, the impoverished have had no place to turn and little to lose by
joining the Zapatista rebellion."27 Rossett contends that "the roots of the struggle do
indeed spring from the history of marginalization and racism to which the Maya Indians
have been subject, but their Declaration of War and other statements clearly reach out to
the poor of all ethnic groups across the length and breadth of greater Mexico." The
Zapatista movement in this way was able to capitalize on the fragmented groups within
the region, all persecuted or having some vulnerability, which in turn made it easy to
accept the single Zapatista image of the world. The conditions were ripe for rebellion,
and the mobilization of these disenfranchised groups was not difficult. For a history of
the EZLN itself, refer to Appendix A.
26







III. THE WINDS OF CHANGE
A. IMAGE
The environment in which an individual lives has a significant impact on the way
he perceives the world and, logically following this, it also affects the way he behaves.
Moreover, humans act toward things on the basis of the meanings that these things hold
for them, and this meaning is derived from or arises out of the social interaction that they
have with others. Based on these meanings and an individual's environment, an image of
the world is created. The Zapatistas have fashioned their image of the world and
perpetrate it using symbols. Their social interaction has been actualized through the
press, the Internet, and their contact with outside groups in other forums (such as
Indigenous Conferences). Before delving into the role of image, however, it is necessary
to have a brief synopsis of this concept.
Kenneth Boulding calls this image of the world "knowledge", what one believes
to be true. His "Organic Theory of Knowledge" has three basic components: (1)
knowledge is what somebody knows; (2) without a knower, knowledge is an absurdity
(think of the tree falling in the woods); and (3) growth of knowledge is the growth of an
"organic" structure. The first proposition of his theory is that behavior depends on the
image, which in turn is built up as a result of all past experiences of the image itself. All
of these aspects make up a person's subjective knowledge structure which itself is
subjective and, thus, can be manipulated through the use of symbols, since it is through
symbols and their meanings that an image is conceived.
17
Boulding's theory addresses the image as both "private" and "public". We share
and have a belief that this image of the world is shared by other people like ourselves
who also are part of our image of the world. The basic bond of any society, culture,
subculture, or organization is a "public" image, that is, "an image the essential
characteristics ofwhich are shared by the individuals participating in the group." There
is, however, a relationship between these two images, as there is a "strange dynamic
instability arising out of the fact that persons themselves are to a considerable extent what
their images make them. Because the image is a creation of the message, people tend to
remake themselves in the image which other people have of them." Moreover, this
"remaking" is apparent in another variant with regard to a subculture (group of people
sharing a "public" image).
If...there are basic similarities in the images of the different individuals in
the group, the behavior of the group will reflect and will, in general,
reinforce the similarities. This is because the symbolic messages which
are issued from individuals in the group reflect in some degree the image
which they possess, and these messages when received by other
individuals in the group confirm the image which is held by the
recipient.
31
Thus, we can see the importance of group culture and the role of images not only
in remaking the group image, but also on the individual images members have of
themselves as well as of the group, powerful enough to override their own individual
images of the world. Moreover, these images affect and influence the resultant behavior
ofthe group. Knowledge, then, is relative and meaning is a product of both "private" and




Boulding mentions a famous experiment in which all but one in a group are told to lie to the single
member who is unaware of the ruse about the length of lines in a drawing. In a large number of instances
the single member was persuaded to "disbelieve his senses by the symbolic messages of his peers." Ibid.,
pp. 132-3.
18
"public" image, neither of which is absolute or permanent. A group made up of
relatively dissimilar individuals (such as appears to be the case within the Zapatistas,
made up of Protestants, Catholic Liberation Theologists, mestizo peasants, and landless
Indians), can thus be unified if their group image and their resultant actions and behaviors
share some similarities.
B. SYMBOLS, RITUAL AND MYTH
These actions and behaviors are often manifested in ritual and myth. The social
order of any society can be better understood through an examination of the societal
rituals, myths, and symbols. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a symbol is
"something that represents something else by association, resemblance, or convention,
especially a material object used to represent something invisible.32 Building on this
definition, ritual, as defined by Kertzer, is a "symbolic behavior that is socially
J-5
standardized and repetitive,... action wrapped in a web of symbolism."
Rituals are designed also to influence natural entities or forces on behalf of the
actors' goals and interests.34 Focusing on the importance of ritual in unifying groups,
rituals also "function[s] to draw all people together to emphasize their similarities and
common heritage; to minimize their differences, and to contribute to their thinking,
feeling, and acting alike."35 Examples of rituals include written constitutions and other
documents, worship and initiation rites in non-literate societies, and stories of common
descent from a founding ancestor. In essence, "we are what we do, not what we think."36
32
Excerpted from The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition, Houghton
Mi fflin Company, 1 996, electronic version from Microsoft Bookshelf 98.
33 David I.Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, Yale University Press, 1988, p.9.
34
Victor W. Turner, "Symbols in African Ritual," Science, v. 179, 16 March 1972, pp.183.




Societies need ritual. They are inherent to giving purpose and identity to groups,
and are critical to creating an understandable image of the world and giving meaning to
everyday life. Kertzer adds that
Ritual fulfills important organizational needs, it helps provide legitimacy
at the same time as it mystifies actual power relations, it facilitates popular
solidarity, even where consensus is conspicuously absent, and it leads
people to conceive oftheir political universe in certain ways.
3
From this point of view it is easy to see that participation in elections is not
simply the exercise of a political choice, but also is participation in a ritual act. As in all
rituals, whether in primitive or modern societies, they serve to draw attention to common
social ties and to the importance and apparent reasonableness of accepting the public
policies that are adopted; only in a minor degree is it participation in policy formation.
In this way, voting becomes a symbolic affirmation of the voters' acceptance of the
political system and their role within it. The ritual of casting their vote becomes
important because it turns the voters' attention to a particular model of 'politics,' of the
nature of political conflict and the possibilities of political change. Moreover, "it results
from and reinforces the belief, in which there is normally little truth, that elections give
them an influence over government policy."39
Similarly, mythology, according to Edelman, is the "belief held in common by a
large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning; it is typically
socially cued rather than empirically based."40 By examining the mythology of a people,





39 Steven Lukes, Essays in Social Theory, Columbia University Press, 1977, p.72.
40 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, University ofChicago Press, 1988, p.l.
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true, and the values that they hold highest. Although this thesis will not devote a large
amount of space to this particular aspect of society, it is important to note its role in
developing and perpetrating an image, as well as for understanding those symbols and
myths which have been appropriated by a particular organization.
As time passes, events of import to a people, redolent with detail, retain
only the skeleton of their significance or, having lost much of their
previous content, these events become vehicles for new significations. At
the same time, such events embody contemporary meanings, legitimized
by an implicit reference to a historic past; simultaneously, they (event-
meaning) legitimate the past by exemplifying its continuity in the
present.
41
This idea is clearly seen in the case of the Zapatistas. They have, as will be shown,
effectively used historical myths as vehicles for new meanings. Their use of both
Mexican and Mayan myths, coupled with newly created rituals, has infused new
significance to the old figures, and by linking to these historical myths and legends, has
also added a legitimacy to their insurgent group.
C. ROLE OF CULTURE
The role of culture is just as critical to understanding how perceptions are
interpreted, how images are created, and why symbols, rituals, and myths take on
particular meanings. "Perceptions and misperceptions about political threats and issues
are crucial in political behavior,"
42
and the manipulation of these perceptions through the
careful use of symbols can potentially modify and influence a group's behavior and
image of another group, institution, or other entity.
41
Janet L. Dolgin and JoAnn Magdoff, "The Invisible Event," in Janet L. Dolgin and JoAnn Magdoff, eds.,




As Berkley showed43 , an individual's physical state plays a significant part in
determining how one perceives reality. In other words, environment and social
interaction with others affect people's perceptions and thus their image of the world. In
addition to and related to these factors is that of culture, defined simply as a "shared way
of life of a group ofpeople."
44
Because the environments and values of different cultures
varies, their languages and linguistic systems also differ, affecting the manner in which
they perceive, interpret symbols, and develop their images of the world.
The definitions of "in-group" and "out-group" are likewise affected by culture. In-
group definitions and the guidelines of behavior toward persons included in these groups
vary across cultures
45
, which in turn affect the selection of symbols and meanings as they
apply to various groups and subgroups within or without a particular culture, group or
organization.
D. IMAGES FOR INSURGENCY
The use of symbols, ritual, and myth are thus central to the creation of an image.
Persuasion and popular support, both necessary aspects of insurgency, in turn are affected
by this image. Persuasion, simply put, is the art of perceiving weak spots in the images
of others and of prying them apart with well-constructed symbolic messages. Similarly,
43 To reconstruct his famous experiment, place one hand in the hot water and the other hand in the cold
water. Keep them there for about three minutes, then plunge both hands at the same time into the third
basin of lukewarm water. From Marshall H. Segall, et al., Human Behavior in Global Perspective: An
Introduction to Cross-Cultural Psychology, Pergamon Press, 1990, p.69.
44
Ibid., p.44.
45 One group of researchers discovered that these definitions differ from culture to culture. They found that
Greeks defined the in-group as more personal in character than an American one, including in their
definition family members, friends, and even foreign tourists, but not persons one doesn't know, even if
they happen to be Greek. Americans, on the other hand, do not typically consider foreign tourists part of
the in-group; but all Americans, even those unknown personally, are usually included. From H. C.
Triandis, et. al., "Three Cross-Cultural Studies of Subjective Culture," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology Monographs, v. 8, 1968, as quoted in Segall et. al., Human Behavior in Global Perspective,
p.338.
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popular support relies on image, since the crafting of a favorable image in key to gaining
such support. Mao Tse-tung concluded, "Because guerrilla warfare basically derives
from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates
itself from their sympathies and cooperation." Image thus becomes the basic premise of
all propaganda, and its use by the Zapatistas is no exception. Several factors that
influence image will now discussed, focusing on their impacts on insurgent
organizations.
1. Symbols
In order to perpetrate and create an image, the organization needs symbols. The
process of using symbols to create a desired image can be described as the pursuit of
social power, defined by Boulding as "the capacity to make people identify with some
organization to which they give loyalty."47 More specifically, however, when a
"movement organization chooses symbols with which to frame its message, it sets a
strategic course between its cultural setting, its political opponents and the militants and
ordinary citizens whose support it needs."48 Thus, the selection and use of these cultural
symbols is not just chance, but requires synthesis and action in order to imbue the
symbols with meaning favorable to the organization.
2. Appropriation of Symbols
Although meanings of symbols are not universal, their meanings can be
"appropriated", in a sense, and used for a group's own purposes. The appropriation of
46 As quoted in Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 147.
47




symbols49 is basically the "ability to use the symbols of the dominators for alternative
purposes; the ability to use the very imagery of political legitimacy to expose the
illegitimacy of those in power."50 The appropriation of such symbols is a response to the
"ideological hegemony"51 described by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in that
The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has
control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that. . .the
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the
relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of dominance.52
Scott concludes that appropriation of symbols was not just a struggle between rich and
poor in his Malayan village over work, property rights, grain, and cash. Instead, it was
over who to "identify causes and assess blame, a contentious effort to give partisan
meaning to local history," much as is seen today in the Zapatistas movement.
3. Garnering of Support
Besides creating an overall image favorable to the goals of the organization, the
manipulation of symbols can also be used to generate support, both external and internal.
According to J. Bowyer Bell, "the insurgent faithful often refuse to believe that the 'truth
is not apparent beyond their own group," and notes that
49
Scott discusses this concept while observing a Malayan village for a study, in which he analyzes social
interactions among the villagers. Earle also applies this concept to the case of the Zapatistas. See
discussions in James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, Yale
University Press, 1985 as well as Duncan Earle, "Indigenous Identity at the Margin: Zapatismo and




Antonio Gramsci, noted Italian militant and socialist scholar who influenced many Marxist scholars, first
used this term. He used this to describe the process of ideological domination, used in its symbolic or
idealist sense. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans, by Quinten
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. Quoted from Scott, p.315.
52




Guerrilla texts often insist that the word is more important than the war, in
reality, the war is the word made manifest. This must be explained,
elaborated, and reinforced, especially among the true believers who do not
carry guns... insurgent movements always recognize the need to
disseminate the 'truth' as rapidly and broadly as possible.54
Symbols, however, must have meaning or relevance "to everyday lives,
frustrations, and successes"55 or else they become meaningless or impotent. They are
like the "reactions of spectators in a museum to the icons of a culture with which they
feel no empathy," or the yawn of an affluent person in response to the term
"unemployment" contrasted with the constant fear of a worker vulnerable to layoff.56
4. Vulnerability of Groups
The alienated, disenfranchised, or marginalized groups become central in any
discussion of rebellions and insurgent movements, for it is these very groups that are
most vulnerable or susceptible to change, in whatever form is most applicable or
accessible to their situations. It is also these same groups that are usually not included in
any exchange of opposing views on important issues. David Kertzer notes that
Lacking the formal organization and the material resources that help
perpetrate the rule of the elite, the politically deprived need a means of
defining a new collectivity. This collectivity, created through ritual and
symbols, not only provides people with an identity different from that
encouraged by the elite, but also serves as a means to recruit others to their
side. An insurgent force that lacks its own distinctive symbolism and rites
is not likely to get very far.
57
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J. Bowyer Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem,'







5. Language and The Power of Ambiguity
The manipulation of appropriated symbols and exploitation of vulnerabilities can
contribute to the alignment with an ideology or image, which in turn can be used to reach
a goal or garner support for a particular group. Max Lerner stated on the eve of the
second World War that "while a dictator's power stems from symbols they manipulate,
the symbols in turn depend upon the entire range of associations that they invoke."58 He
continued that "the power of these symbols in enormous. Men possess thoughts, but
symbols possess men."59 In fact, the term "leadership" (like the terms "problem" and
"enemy") is itself a political weapon. "It catalyzes an intricate language game that draws
its appeal from a complex of psychological needs including an incentive to blame or
praise identifiable people for changes in well-being and an effort to understand why
changes take place."60
In terms of the appeals of leaders and the language they use, the favored strategy
is ambiguity. This strategy "avoids offending those who might find a clear promise
offensive, encourages everyone to read their own preferences into the language, and at
the same time permits speakers to emphasize their difference from rivals by relying on
stylistic idiosyncrasies."
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Taking this further, the use of ambiguous symbols can unify
heterogeneous groups, giving a common identity to those groups of mixed subcultures.
According to Martin Silvermon, "it is possible to maintain identities which may be
potential conflict by isolating a symbolic form to a particular practice, or making the
'8
In Ideas for the Ice Age, Viking Press, 1941, p.235. As quoted in Kertzer, p.5. Lerner made this








meanings appear more abstract so that the contradictions appear resolved."62 He uses the
history of American Jews to illustrate "the process through which potentially conflicting
identities can appear harmonious by the allocation of different aspects of identity to
different domains,"63 solving the contradiction of national identity and simultaneous
identity as a member of an ethnic minority.
It is easy to see how an ambiguous symbol, which holds varied meaning
according to group and culture, becomes the vehicle of choice for leaders of rebellions,
revolutions, and insurgencies. Because the success of these movements depends on
alignment of persons (most easily from disenfranchized and marginalized groups) with
the leaders' own images of the world, it is imperative that they select those symbols
which will accomplish this while at the same time understanding the cultures to which
they appeal. The political language and selected symbology can therefore either "win or
maintain public support or acquiescence in the face of other actions that violate moral
qualms and typically does so by denying the premises on which such actions are based
while retaining traces of the premises."
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E. SYNTHESIS OF IMAGE AND REBELLION
Thus, we see that symbols play a vital role in shaping the images of various
groups. Through discourse and "ideological persuasion," it is possible to reshape or
create an image or "truth". Using symbols and messages that address cultural differences
in perception as well as the "weak spots in the images" of others, images can be
influenced. Moreover, using symbols and appeals that are favorable to a group's existing
62




Ibid., p. 11 5.
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images of the world will help allow the messages to be more easily received. In this way,
there are several areas within the realm of rebellion and insurgency to which these
principles of image, symbols, ritual and myth can be applied.
1. Legitimization
First and perhaps most importantly, these principles can help to legitimize a group
or organization. The use of rituals, as described by Kertzer, can aid in the legitimization
of an organization, both internal and outside the subculture.
65 Using references to an
historic past as well as myths, as noted by Dolgin and MagdofT, help perpetrate this
legitimacy, connecting the present to these pasts, as well as legitimizing the history
through its continuity in the present.
66
Appropriating symbols from an adversary,
particularly if it is a legitimate symbol of their image of the world, will further contribute
to legitimizing an organization. The organization itself and the leaders it creates also
constitute a ritual in their existence. Moreover, both the organization's structure and the
leader, himself a symbol of organizational unity and the embodiment of the
organization's ideology and goals, contribute to this legitimization, both internal and
external.
2. Member Unification
Second, heterogeneous subgroups can be unified within an organization,
solidifying its membership. This is done through the use of rituals, which create a new,
unifying identity or image, minimizing internal differences. Myths, which focus on those
images of values and truths favorable to the organization, will also provide a common




organization and is then projected outward, the members will, either consciously or not,
remake themselves in this image that others hold of them.67 The power of such group
culture and image is strong enough, as he discussed, to cause a member to override his
own image of the world. Integrative social power, besides legitimizing, also serves to
unify and inspire loyalty. Again, this is done through the creation of an image,
specifically, an image of the future. Additionally, the use of ambiguous appeals can
appear to resolve any contradiction in a heterogeneous subculture. This strategy of




External support, or support outside an organization's culture, can be garnered
through the use of ambiguous appeals to other "politically deprived" or disenfranchized
groups or organizations. Again, using this strategy minimizes differences as well as
gives the appearance of little contradiction among the groups. Additionally, by creating a
network of supporting organizations, an image of legitimacy is created, and more so if the
network includes more "legitimate" organizations. Understanding cultural differences is
critical to ensuring that the messages and symbols used in the appeals are favorable to
their images ofthe world as well as address the weak spots in those images.
4. Internal Support
Internal support, or support within the culture yet outside the organization's
subculture (i.e., Mexicans outside Chiapas), can be raised through the use of historic
66





symbols, references to common past, and appropriation of symbols which hold some
degree of legitimacy with this group. The legitimization of the organization contributes
greatly to the amount of internal support, and the use of ambiguous appeals also helps
resolve apparent contradictions in much the same way as for unifying heterogeneous
subcultures within the organization itself.
5. Recruitment
Recruitment of additional members can also be accomplished through the use of
legitimization techniques. By creating an understandable image of the world and
achieving a degree of legitimacy, the organization holds great appeal to those from
marginalized groups or those confused by a complex world (perhaps resulting from
economic or social changes in traditional societies). The sense of subcultural identity and
common image of the world fills the vacuum left by those who have become "politically
deprived" or further disenfrachized and allows them to remake themselves in a new
image that the organization and those outside the organization hold. As Kertzer
described, this new collectivity from symbol and ritual helps recruit these particular
groups.
70 Of course, this works best with "organizations of the alientated," but as
Skocpol and Goodwin noted, these are the groups that most often make up successful
71
revolutions.
6. Challenge to Existing Powers
Finally, the use of appropriated symbols can be an effective tool in challenging






its own legitimacy. By appealing to the existing framework of power, and perhaps also
using the strategy of ambiguous appeal, the image of reform becomes more legitimate
and favorable to the existing images held by those groups supporting the existing power
structures. Thus, the achievement of legitimacy becomes critical to not only the
organization's image, its external and internal support, and recruitment of its members,
but also becomes central to its challenge to the current institutions ofpower.
71 Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," Politics
and Society, v. 17, no.4, 1989, pp.490 and 497.
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IV. THE SKY DARKENS
A. TARGET AUDIENCES
Now that the symbolic frame for assessing rebellions and insurgency has been
established, it will be applied to the Zapatistas in particular. Before examining the
specific symbols used by them (in Chapter V), however, this chapter will first address the
target audiences and, second, the means of disseminating their messages and symbols to
these audiences. Finally, the ends the Zapatistas hope to achieve through the use of these
symbols and means will be discussed, looking at how they have attempted to achieve
those goals necessary for a successful rebellion: legitimization, member unification,
external and internal support, recruitment, and challenges to existing powers.
Target audiences are selected based on their ability to effect, either positively or
negatively, the goals of the organization. The second chapter's discussion of the
grievances and stratification within the region laid the groundwork for the next discussion
of not only the potential target audiences, but also the means and ends used by the
Zapatistas to reach their goals of legitimacy, member unification, and support. By
exploiting the weak spots in the images of these audiences and targeting them with well-
constructed symbolic messages, an organization can sell its image to these groups or
subcultures.
There are three main groups that have been targeted by the Zapatistas: the
disenfranchised peoples within Chiapas, Mexican society outside of Chiapas, and various
activist groups. These groups and their susceptibilities will be briefly discussed, with a
breakdown of the different activist groups that were targeted.
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1. Disenfranchised of Chiapas
The social and economic conditions in Chiapas created marginalized groups,
alienated from the rest of society, who have subsequently become central to the Zapatista
rebellion. The diverse mix of expulsados, landless peasants, and marginalized Indians
were without the security of their traditional communities, who had sent them fleeing to
the Lacandon jungles. This group was thus left without identity, which was normally
provided by the community. As a result, they became susceptible to issues concerning
land rights and ownership, identification with a group and, subsequently, a sense of
"belongingness", economic and social justice, and positive government recognition of
these people. A vulnerable group, this audience has provided the core membership of the
Zapatistas.
2. Mexican Society Outside of Chiapas
Although not marginalized, the Mexican society outside of Chiapas has also been
a valuable target audience, providing not only domestic support, but also indirectly
influencing the government's actions and reactions. By appealing to a common
indigenous heritage and Mexican nationalism, the Zapatistas have attempted to exploit
this group's susceptibility to the idea of guilt for past treatment of Indians, pride in the
heroes of the Mexican Revolution, nationalism, and, to a lesser degree, anti-U.S. feelings
and NAFTA fears. The anti-American susceptibilities were not directly exploited for the
obvious reason of alienating their supporters in the United States.
12
Meaning "expelled ones", these are the Protestant, other evangelicals, and followers of the Catholic
Liberation Theology who were expelled from their communities by the more traditional Catholic citizens.
In addition to following different faiths, they usually refused to buy liquor or provide financial
contributions for religious festivals, a primary source of income to many caciques or strongmen in the
communities. The actual expulsions were usually violent and involved public beating, humiliation, and
even death before being expelled from the community.
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Marcos, as an obvious ladino from the Mexican middle class, is an excellent
bridge between the two cultures. Through his wit, charm, and charisma, Mexicans of
similar background easily identified with him and, as a result, were much more
sympathetic to the Zapatistas. Moreover, this sympathy provided valuable support in
terms of influencing government response.
3. Social Activists and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
The first of these groups are Indigenous rights organizations. One Native
American movement leader affirms that the Zapatistas share a "commonality, affinity,
and solidarity"73 with indigenous rights movements throughout the Americas. The
"sweep of American Indian resistance to colonial domination... has been ongoing without
real interruption since the first conquistador set foot in this hemisphere more than five
hundred years ago."74 Marcos, in a letter to "the leaders of the indigenous peoples" of the
U.S., asked for their support and intercession "before the powerful who govern the [U.S.],
to tell them not to support the war against our race, nor the persecution of our ideals."
Overall, this group is particularly vulnerable to the ideas of indigenous rights, land issues,
autonomy, and, to a lesser degree, traditional spiritual issues and values. These are not
dissimilar to the demands of the Zapatistas, who claim to be fighting on behalf of their
own indigenous members and as well as "all indigenous people."76
The next categories of organizations to which the Zapatistas appeal are the
feminist and women's rights groups, both within Mexico as well as outside. The "Laws
73




National Commission for Democracy in Mexico, USA, [moonhght@igc.apc.org], "EZLN letter to US
indigenous], in Chiapas-1, [chiapas-l@profmexis.dgsca.unam.mx], 20 March 1997.
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of Women" (one full chapter in their first official communique) and the "Demands of
Indigenous Women" (issued as part of their thirty-four demands during peace
negotiations with the government) were issued by the Zapatistas in 1994 (see Appendix B
for full texts of both documents). They targeted the women within Chiapas (see Figure
4), constrained by traditional cultures, and also appealed to women's rights groups
outside the region.
One local historian notes that in Chiapas, women of the Tzeltal, Tzotzil and
Tojolabal tribes are especially shy. Rarely do they look foreigners in the eyes, and
sometimes they walk away when asked a question.77 Another observes that the women
in Chiapas are doubly discriminated against: "They are oppressed by society for being
Indians, and they are oppressed within their communities for being women." This
makes much more notable, then, the appearance of many women in leadership positions
within the organization.
One such figure is Comandante Ramona, the only female member of the
Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee.79 Ramona is practically a cult hero in
Chiapas after her prominent role in the 1994 peace talks and at the National Indigenous
Conference two years later. Much the same a barometer of popularity as in the U.S.,
"dolls ofwomen fighters sold to tourists are called 'Ramonas'"81 (see Figure 5).
76 EZLN, "Communique, February 1, 1994: To 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance," in Ben Clarke and
Clifton Ross, eds., Voice of Fire: Communiques and Interviews from the Zapatista National Liberation
Army, trans, by Clifton Ross, etal., New Earth Publications, 1994, p.64.
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Blanche Petrich, "Voices from the Masks," in Katzenberger, pp.42-44.
80
"111 Rebel Leader Greeted Warmly in Mexico City," San Jose Mercury News, 12 October 1996, p.l7A.
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Figure 4. Plight of the women in Chiapas. From Totoro Taulis, 181.
Figure 5. "Ramonas" for sale in Chiapas. From Totoro Taulis, 163.
81
"A Dying Zapatista Rebel with a Cause: Ramona's Wish To Address Indian Conference," San Jose
Mercury News, 11 October 1996, p.8A.
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Outside of Chaipas, the appeal is for "Mexican women... not to take up arms but
that they support in their own contexts the changes proposed in [the Zapatista "Laws of
Women" and "Demands of Indigenous Women"] for equality, justice, health, education
and housing."82 There are a number of feminist organizations outside Mexico that have
also lent their support to the Zapatistas. One example is the popular U.S. music group,
Indigo Girls, which has not only contributed proceeds from their Honor the Earth concert
series, but also traveled to Chiapas (their online Website Diary details their visit). All of
these feminist groups share common ideals of women's rights and appear to have the
same susceptibilities, refrained within the contexts of their own societies: equality,
justice, recognition, and participation within their societies. Figure 6 shows a group of
Zapatista women in Chiapas, and Figure 7 is a poster distributed by a pro-Zapatista
organization in the U.S. appealing to the outrage against rape, allegedly occurring with
alarming frequency against women in Chiapas by members of the army.
The last category of activists targeted by the Zapatistas is that ofhuman rights and
other social activists. The list includes groups such as Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch/Americas Watch, the International Human Rights Federation, the Christian
Action to Abolish Torture, the National Commission for Democracy in Mexico,
American Friends Service Committee,83 and Physicians for Human Rights, to name but a
few. In 1996, for example, nearly three thousand activists and community
representatives from 42 countries gathered in five different villages in Chiapas, Mexico
82 EZLN, "Interview, March 7, 1994: Don't Abandon Us!" in Clarke and Ross, p.87.
13 The AFSC is a Quaker organization of different faiths which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947 for
their work for social justice, peace, and humanitarian service. See their website at [http://www.afsc.org] for
more information.
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Figure 7. Poster appealing to outrage against rape, targeting feminist activists in




for the "Intercontinental Encuentro for Humanity and Against Neo-liberalism."84 Given
the documented history in Mexico of widespread torture and ill treatment, due process
abuses, and election fraud and related violence (particularly against indigenous, poor, and
or
women), these groups are susceptible to any suspension of human rights, torture, or
mistreatment of citizens within a country. By focusing on this aspect, the Zapatistas have
also forced the government to restrain their use of force against the rebels as the
international community watches.
Other miscellaneous targets, besides the indirect U.S. agents mentioned above,
include U.S. senators as well as the general U.S. public. Marcos warns that if the U.S.
government helped the Mexican government defeat the Zapatistas, a civil war would
erupt, causing many to flee and become displaced, and causing further problems in the
U.S.:
What would happen with immigration to the United States if the conflict
was not just in Chiapas? Chiapas has about three million people and
Mexico has some ninety million -- you can do the multiplication yourself.
So the U.S. government should keep in mind that if there is a civil war in
Mexico, it doesn't matter how big or thick the wall along the border is. It
doesn't matter what material the wall is made out of. If there is a civil war
in Mexico, the wall along the U.S. border will come tumbling down.86
84
"Action Zapatista," [http://www.utexas.edu/students/nave/zaps.html, 10 September 1997.
85 For more information, see Amnesty International's reports on "AI's Concerns Regarding Torture and 111
Treatment in Mexico" (AMR 41/17/97, dated March 1996) and "Overcoming Fear: Human Rights
Violations Against Women in Mexico" (AMR 41/09/96, dated March 1996), and the 9 February 1996
report issued by Human Rights Watch/Americas Watch report charging the government with "a pattern of
human rights violations" in 1995. Most recently, the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
report, "Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Mexico. 11/04/97", finds that "torture
has continued to be practiced systematically in Mexico, especially by the judicial police, federal as well as
local, and, most recently, by military troops under the pretext of the anti-subversive war"(author's trans.)
[http://193.135.156.15/HTML/cat.htm]. Additionally, the Interamerican Human Rights Commission
(affiliated with the Organization of American States) issued a confidential report published in La Jornada,
regarding torture and murder of three Indians in early 1994 and made a series of recommendations, with
which the government said it planned to comply.
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In yet another letter he asks:
We address this letter to you [North America] to tell you that the Mexican
federal government is using U.S. economic and military support to
massacre Chiapas' indigenous people...We would like to know whether
the U.S. Congress and the citizens of the United States of North America
approved this military and economic aid to combat narco-trafficking or to
murder indigenous people in southeastern Mexico. 87
The common theme is the exploitation of fears of drugs and immigrants spilling over into
U.S. borders.
Additionally, audiences are targeted by language. The EZLN communiques are
published and translated on the listservers and Internet in mostly Spanish and English
(the majority of the pro-Zapatista NGOs and support groups are in the U.S., Canada and
Australia). Additionally, there is a substantial amount translated and then published in
French (targeting French-speaking Canadians as well as French citizens — Mme.
Mitterand even visited Chiapas in 1994), German, and Italian.
Target audiences can be subdivided even further based on a wide range of
discriminators and possible susceptibilities, as evidenced by Marcos' appeal to Mexicans
during their march into the capital city:
A Mexico for the workers and farmers.
A Mexico for the indigenous people.
A Mexico for the unemployed.
A Mexico for the squatters.
A Mexico for the housewives.
A Mexico for the professionals.
A Mexico for the teachers.
A Mexico for the students.
A Mexico for the youth.
A Mexico for the women.
A Mexico for the children.
A Mexico for the elderly.
86 Medea Benjamin, "Interview: Subcomandante Marcos," in Katzenberger, p.59.
87 EZLN, "Communique, January 1994: A Message to North America, in Clarke and Ross, p. 17.
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A Mexico for all the Mexican men and women regardless of their sexual
preference.
A Mexico for all the poor of the country, because the poor is the majority
ofMexicans due to the acts of the rulers and the powerful.
A Mexico for all the Mexicans.
That is why we ask all the people of Mexico to support us in this cry for
justice.
Because our struggle belongs to everyone.88
It is hard to imagine any group who might not be included in this universal appeal
(and hard as well to not compare it to many campaign platforms seen today in the U.S.!).
All of these groups provide support internationally and domestically, as well as serve to
give the impression of a large and broad support base (the implications of this will be
discussed in the next section). By successfully identifying those groups who might
provide support or assistance as well as identifying their susceptibilities, the messages
can thus be crafted to affect the image of value, discussed in Chapter II, which can then
influence their image of the world and of the Zapatistas.
As Boulding proposed, it is this image which then affects behavior. To turn it in
their favor, of course, is the goal of the Zapatistas. Because these target audiences share
basic similarities in their images, messages using these images of the world will help
reinforce the Zapatistas image that they are trying to sell. In order to be successful,
however, they must focus on their targets' susceptibilities while at the same time
presenting their struggle as being similar to their own (e.g., indigenous rights, women's
equality, successful war on drugs). This is, as was previously stated, the whole art of
88
Chiaipas95-Lite, [owner-chiapas95-lite@mundo.eco.utexas.edu], "EZLN Communique, (Greetings to
DF) Sep 2," [chiapas95-lite@mundo.eco.utexas.edu], 14 September 1997.
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persuasion: to identify the weak spots in the images of others and pry them apart with
well-constructed messages.
B. ZAPATISTA MEANS
The next step, after the target audiences and weaknesses have been identified, is
to select the means through which the messages are sent. When identifying the target
audiences, it follows that those mediums used by the groups would be the means of
choice for the Zapatistas. Subsequently, they appear to use primarily the news media and
the Internet for disseminating their messages.
The majority of Mexicans outside Chiapas rely on the news media for their news
and information, while the preponderance of social activist groups, located all over the
globe, conduct their business and grass roots campaigns over the Internet. The
dissemination of the Zapatista messages within Chiapas towards the disenfrachised, on
the other hand, is largely accomplished through the pastoral networks established within
the region, as well as face-to-face communications in such forms as rallies, marches,
graffiti, etc. Due to his skill at writing and public affairs, Marcos has been able to
effectively employ these means, thereby reaching audiences both within Mexico and
around the world.
1. News Media
Beginning in the first hours of 1994, the Zapatistas concentrated their efforts on
media and press releases, avoiding the pro-government media (the government-owned
Televisa, for example) and favoring the independent press.89 Their interviews were
59
According to Petrich, in Katzenberger, pp.4 1-54, several journalists had been secretly invited by the
leaders of the EZLN to a meeting held on 1 February 1994. The purpose was for the Zapatistas "to express
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likewise not limited to Mexican newspapers, such as Proceso, but included journalists
from The Miami Herald and The New York Times, as well as faxed communiques to the
Herald Wire Services, the Associated Press, Reuters and other major wire services. The
importance of publicizing their cause worldwide was not lost on the Zapatistas, and
accomplished the purpose of not only garnering support but also served to restrain the
Mexican government as the international public watched how they responded,
particularly in terms of adherence to human rights.
During July and August of 1995, the EZLN attempted public-opinion polling in
27 US cities (to include San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley), as well as in 26 other
countries ranging from New Zealand to Paraguay to Libya and at 10,000 locations
throughout Mexico. The polling questions themselves left no doubt as to the desired
responses, with only three possible answers (yes, no, and I don't know) to such questions
as "Do you agree with the principal demands of the Mexican people and the EZLN for:
land, housing, jobs, food, health, education, culture, information, security, freedom from
corruption, defense of the environment, independence, democracy, liberty, justice and
peace?"
91 According to the poll's organizers, they were not intended to determine public
opinion, but rather to "keep people talking about the issues,"
92
particularly during the
cease-fire and slow peace negotiations that were ongoing at the time.
In addition to a proliferation of communiques issued under the auspices of the
EZLN, Marcos himself gave exclusive interviews and a continuous flow of personalized
their point of view and respond to the thousands of questions that were swirling around them" (see pp.48-
49).
90






editorials, responding often to individual letters. Not only were they witty and flowery in
the typical style of the Spanish language, but these editorials, with his signature
postscripts, appealed to all Mexicans and gave them a representative with whom
everyone could seemingly identify. Photographs and videos, for the same reasons, have
also been used effectively, with seemingly "staged" shots designed to fully maximize any
opportunity available.
2. The Internet
The Internet, on the other hand, targets a larger audience than does the news
media, which focuses on what appears to be primarily Mexican society.93 While the
interviews and press releases seem to reach the domestic audiences, the Internet is used to
reach foreign audiences.
94
This is arguably the greatest advantage of using this particular
medium: "the ability to efficiently reach large numbers of individuals who are potential
political actors, [which then] plays to the strengths of special interest groups and political
action committees."95 There are a number of websites devoted to Zapatista support,
including the EZLN's official site, "Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation Nacional," as well as
"Action Zapatista," "Chiapas," "Chiapas Menu," "Zapatismo Communications Net," and
even Marcos' children's stories at the "Conversations with Durito" site. Moreover, the
sites are not limited only to Canada and the U.S., as can be seen by the origins of these
3
This is not to say, however, that the Zapatistas have ignored the foreign press. They continue to fax
communiques, albeit to a lesser extent now, to international news and wire services, although Mexico City's
La Jornado has continued to be their favorite and most cooperative publication.
94 As of 1996, about ninety percent of Internet traffic in Mexico was handled through the universities
connected to the Red Tecnologica Nacional (RTN), an Internet backbone created in 1994. Commercial
providers, though, can now be found in nearly fifty cities in Mexico, and Internet use domestically is
expected to grow considerably, especially since the government opened the long-distance market up in
early 1997 and an MCI subsidiary subsequently announced it will offer Internet access. From Gary
Chapman, "Zapatistas, Other Realities of Mexico on the Internet," San Jose Mercury News, 25 November
1996, p.6E.
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websites: "Solidarite avec les Communautes Zapatistes du Chiapas" (France), "Mark's
Irish Solidarity Page," "EZLN: Tierra y Libertad" (Japanese), "Comite de Solidaridad con
Mexico en Holanda" (Holland), "Coordinamento Zapatista per l'ltalia" (Italy), and the
"Melbourne Page of the Zapatista Solidarity Collective" (Australia) webpages. The
pages link to similar "informational" sites, with several linking to other activist groups.
They all share the same general symbols, although the EZLN sites (those linking off of
the "Action Zapatista" and "Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation Nacional" pages) display
both the Mexican flag as well as the colors.
Another aspect of the Internet fully exploited by the Zapatistas and their
supporters are the listservs,
96
e-mail bulletin boards, and activist networks. The largest
listservs are "Chiapas95," "Chiapas95-Lite," and "Chaipas-1." Still another service is
"Mexico Update," an electronic bulletin from MEXPAZ which is collectively produced
by NGOs for Peace (CONPAZ). San Francisco-based Institute for Global
Communications (IGC) is the U.S. member of the Association for Progressive
Communications (APC), a coalition of computer networks dedicated specifically to
servicing NGOs and activists for environmental preservation, peace, and human rights. It
is one of the largest and most active international political groups using the Internet and
operate the PeaceNet, EcoNet, ConflictNet, and LaborNet networks. The Zapatistas
make full use of IGC/APC, and are thus able to reach over 25,000 activists and
organizations in more than 130 countries.97
95
Charles Swett, "Strategic Assessment: The Internet," [^ttp://www.infowar.conVniil_c4i/SWETT.html-
ssi], 8 August 1997.
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The primary listservs and webpages are maintained by a coalition of support
organizations in the U.S. called the National Commission for Democracy in Mexico
(NCDM), operating out of Austin, Texas. The Zapatista communiques are also
distributed by the NCDM, although Marcos usually writes them himself.
Typically [he] would write his voluminous communiques on a laptop
computer, which he carried in a backpack and plugged into the lighter
socket of an old pickup truck he used when traveling between remote
[locations],... [which would then] continue to flow unimpeded through
cyberspace, usually reaching readers in countries as distant as Italy,
Germany and Russia faster than they can be published by most Mexican
newspapers....
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Owing to the fact that the coalition maintains such a large percentage of the information
flow on the Internet, which is then copied and reproduced on additional websites, the
symbols and messages tend to be consistent. Moreover, depending on the organization
targeted, there is added emphasis placed on a particular aspect of the Zapatista message
(such as a greater focus on the women's rights situation discussed on the Indigo Girls'
World Wide Web page) in order to reinforce common interests.
3. Truth in the Eye of the Beholder
With the emphasis on creating an image of themselves and selling it to the world
via the news media and the Internet, sooner or later the disadvantages inherent to both
mediums will surface. The primary weakness referred to, of course, is the inability to
verify the accuracy of the stories. Given their need for public sympathy, the Zapatistas
(and their supporters) many times exaggerated accounts of human rights abuses and
attacks supposedly perpetrated by the government in an attempt to bolster their own
8 Todd Robberson, "Mexican Rebels Using A High-Tech Weapon; Internet Helps Rally Support," The
Washington Post, 20 February 1995.
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support by discrediting the government. One such example of an attempt to deceive
occurred in February 1995:
When the army began mobilizing...word went out on the Internet that San
Cristobal was surrounded by tanks and armored cars. While it was true
that the army presence had increased throughout Chiapas, no tanks were to
be found anywhere in the state. One user group [in the U.S.] sent out a
report that airborne bombardments were underway in several named
mountain villages and urged an international protest. They passed on
rebel assertions that women were being raped and children killed. But
reporters who visited those areas and interviewed scores of witnesses said
they were unable to confirm even one such incident." (See Appendix C
for full text).
In fact, it "appears instead that the military has behaved with remarkable restraint by
Latin-American standards," 100 although there are still many valid abuses (noted in
previous footnotes). Thus, in order to raise awareness of the government's human rights
violations and to raise sympathy, the Zapatistas knowingly disseminated bold and false
information on the Internet, usually in the form of their open letters from the EZLN
General Command ofthe Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee.
C. ZAPATISTA ENDS
Using the symbolic frame, the main propaganda goals of the Zapatistas appear to
be legitimization, domestic and international support, and member unification. These are
accomplished using the concepts outlined in Chapter III, such as the use and
appropriation of symbols and ambiguous language. All of these will be discussed, noting
which methods appear to be used to accomplish each end.
"Ibid.
100 Alma Guillermoprieto, "The Unmasking," The New Yorker, 13 March 1995, p.46.
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1. Legitimization
An effective way for an organization to legitimize itself is to link itself to a
historic past, noted by Dolgin and Magdoff, 101 a technique which the Zapatistas have
mastered. Their appropriation of historic figures which have potent connotations of a
glorious and just past (such as Zapata and the Mexican Revolution hold for Mexican
society), have increased their legitimacy and support within the country. The main
symbol of the Zapatistas, Emiliano Zapata, represents the defense of Indian rights and
land reform, ideas that have been presented as central to the Zapatista agenda. By
identifying themselves with such figures and historic events that appeal to most of
Mexican society, they have thus been able to carry the Indian cause to non-Indians,
appropriating the image of Zapata and his revolution for their own rebellion. As one
mestizo bystander, wearing a T-shirt with a portrait of Marcos, commented during the
Zapatistas' march in Mexico City in September, 1997: "The Zapatistas have always held
my attention because they are the defenders of all Indians and of the Mexican people." 102
Figure 8 shows a poster depicting this idea of shared beliefs, asserting that the Zapatista
struggle is the struggle ofthe Mexican people as well.
Kertzer observed103 that rituals could also be used to legitimize. The Zapatista
structure itself is one of the most obvious rituals used for this purpose. The organization,
to include the communal decision-making of the Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine
Committee and the uniformed and disciplined army, is based on existing customary
101
Dolgin and Magdoff, pp.35 1-2.
102
Chiapas95-Lite, [owner-chiapas95-lite@mundo.eco.utexas.edu], "E;AP;EZLN rebels trek unarmed to
capital, Sep 12," in Chiapas95-Lite, [chiapas05-lite@mundo.eco.utexas.edu], 13 September 1997.
"Ritual.
.
.helps provide legitimacy at the same time as it mystifies actual power relations," in Kertzer,
p.153.
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Figure 8. Poster from Resistant Strains Working Group appealing to the
common ideals of the Zapatistas and the rest of Mexican society. From
"The Resistant Strains Working Group" World Wide Web page,
[http://www.dickshovel.com/zapintro.html].
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ladino structures (the army's ranked hierarchy) as well as traditional Maya structures
(communal decision-making by community elders).
De-legitimization of the existing government is yet another technique used by the
Zapatistas. The appeals for reform within the existing, legitimate framework of the
constitution inferred that the Salinas administration, according to the Constitution, was no
longer legitimate by its own definition. Moreover, the Zapatista's emphasis on the history
ofhuman rights violations by the government only furthered their claim of a non-credible
government. In this context, they framed their appeals to the NGOs:
We know that the calls of Non-Governmental Organizations have
remained neutral in the present conflict...preoccupied...with alleviating
the severe conditions in which the civilian population finds itself as well
as to push forces toward peace with dignity as our forces and all honest
Mexicans desire...For the latter we want to respectfully ask you to engage
yourselves in attempting to form this peace zone to prevent Federal troops
as well as those of the EZLN from interrupting the physical space of the
table of dialogue.
2. Support
Closely tied to legitimization is support. The two aspects that this thesis focuses
on are that of the Mexican society outside of Chiapas (that inside Chiapas is discussed
under "Member Unification" and "Recruitment") and that outside Mexico.
The Zapatistas have garnered Mexican support through the use of ambiguous
language and symbols that minimize differences and highlight commonalties. Coupled
with the creation of a likeable human "bridge" between the two subcultures (Zapatistas
and Mexican society), they have clinched their domestic support base, already largely
dissatisfied with the economy, rising crime rates and drug trafficking, and increasing
reports of government corruption. The language of the EZLN's appeals is to their
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"Mexican brothers and sisters," emphasizing their common heritage. The struggle of all
Mexicans during the Mexican Revolution against what the Zapatistas have presented as
the same injustices served to reinforce this idea.
In this way, the Zapatistas have grounded their propaganda on the symbols of the
Mexican Revolution. Furthermore, Marcos himself is a reflection of Mexican society (or
what they would like to think is a reflection) in his attitude and appearance, appealing to
their identification with him and making himself likeable in order to win their support.
His language, his wit, and his image are all construed to create a "bridge", bringing a
seemingly "foreign" peasant and Indian struggle into the folds of acceptable society.
Appealing to the supposed ideals of that very society and the image that they hold
of themselves (e.g., a civil society, democracy, just and equal treatment of all its citizens,
and decent standards of living), the Zapatistas then obligate the members of that society
to act in accordance with those ideals. Dr. Robert Cialdini discusses this facet of social
influence. The desire to be (and to appear) consistent with what an individual has
previously committed to, despite later evidence that the commitment was not such a wise
decision, is done in order to "keep thoughts and beliefs consistent with what the
individual has already done or decided". 105 The trigger that activates this response, the
initial commitment, can be a contribution or simple response in favor of an issue. Once
this initial "commitment" is made, it then becomes almost mechanical for the individual
to continue to make larger "commitments" in order to remain consistent with the
individual's original commitment. This consistency-commitment motivation is strong
104 EZLN, "Communique, February 1, 1994: The Peace Zone," in Clarke and Ross, p.66.
105
Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, William Morrow and Company, Inc.,
1993, p.59.
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enough, backed by research data, to compel individuals to do what they ordinarily would
not want to do (Cialdini uses many marketing examples as well as that of the Chinese
prison-camps during the Korean War106). In the same way, then, initially small
"commitments" such as purchasing a Marcos T-shirt or attending a pro-Zapatista rally or
even responding favorably to a pollster's questions concerning a person's support for the
Zapatistas, have drawn many into the subsequent role of continued supporter for the
Zapatistas.
Although many ofthese same techniques apply to raising support outside Mexico,
the targets appear to be those who are less part of the social mainstream. These groups
tend to be the politically deprived, as was discussed, and the technique is a little different.
Because "fact" and "reality" become irrelevant in the sense that every political object and
1 A "7
person is an interpretation that reflects an ideology, ambiguous language can easily be
employed to those groups most susceptible to change in whatever form most applicable
or accessible to their own situations.
As Silvermon noted, this strategy "encourages everyone to read their own
preferences into the language," 108 and in this way is ideal for use on varying target
audiences. By using ambiguous appeals ("stop helping the Mexican government", "We
call on [Mexicans] to join our movement. .. [with] sympathy, solidarity and support",
"The Chinese in the prison-camp program relied heavily on commitment and consistency pressures to
gain the desired compliance from prisoners. In order to get initial collaboration ("commitment") from the
Americans, they began small, asking them to make statements so mildly anti-American or pro-Communist
as to seem inconsequential ('The U.S. is not perfect." "In a Communist country, unemployment is not a
problem.'). After making these small statements, however, the men found themselves pushed to submit to
related yet more substantive requests, and before long, he found himself a 'collaborator', having given aid to
the enemy. This then resulted many times in the man changing his image in order to remain consistent with
the deed and the new 'collaborator' label." From Cialdini, pp.69-71.
107
Edelman,p.lO.
108 As quoted in Edelman, p.50.
54
"We'd like others from all parts to join us"), the Zapatistas minimize any differences they
might have with potential supporters. The range of their recommended actions, too, is just
as ambiguous, ranging the whole spectrum of support. The official webpage, for
example, lists several ways the reader can show support for the Zapatistas:
Express your support for the EZLN and its demands, and your outrage at
human rights abuses... to Mexican government officials (the email
addresses of Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo and ambassadors from
various countries are conveniently linked);
Send the EZLN or the indigenous refugee communities letters of support
(a link to do this is also provided);
Educate your friends;
Attend a protest rally at the nearest Mexican embassy, consulate, or other
appropriate location, or sponsor your own;
Send humanitarian aid to Chiapas (links to organizations are provided);
Raise money for the EZLN or the refugees (examples such as sponsoring a
benefit concert, selling Zapatista T-shirts, passing the hat at protests, etc.,
are listed);
Join a Peace Encampment in Chiapas (links to appropriate sources
provided);
Assist with [the EZLN] webpage. 109
The list of suggestions are purposely diverse, appealing to the whole spectrum of possible
supporters, and attempts to make it easy for anyone to make a seemingly inconsequential
"initial commitment" (i.e., click on a link to write a few anonymous lines of protest to
someone).
109 EZLN, "How You Can Help the Struggle," [http://www.ezln.org/help.html], in "Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberaci6nNacional,"[http://www.ezln.org], 10 September 1997.
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In addition and somewhat related to ambiguous language is the emphasis on
commonality and minimization of differences, as was done to attract Mexican audiences.
One good example appears in a listserv message directed towards their Italian supporters:
. . .To the rebel peoples of Europe. .
.
Here in Italy and there in Mexico we struggle against racism and
separatism. There in Mexico and here in Italy we struggle for a
community of freedom and mutual aid. Here and there we clash with a
world system that has made a new religion of racism. There and here the
rich and powerful are the greatest fanatics of intolerance against those who
are different....
110
Marcos himself strives to emphasize the similarities while glossing over the
differences between himself and his supporters. Since many of the groups he appeals to
are non-indigenous, one way he accomplishes this is through his image of "a white man
leading a rebellion of oppressed dark-skinned natives with whom he has little in common,
but whose trust he has won....," 111 as well as presenting a likeable image with whom
people readily identify. Again deferring to common marketing principles, the majority of
people will comply with the wishes of someone they know and like. Social scientists
have accumulated a body of evidence which points to several attributable factors:
physical appearance, similarity in background and interests, and familiarity with the
target audience. Thus, Marcos' tactics (whether planned or instinctive) again serve the
Zapatista purpose well.
Lastly, another phenomenon of human psychology used to gain international
support is that of social proof. This is simply the principle that individuals use what
110
Chiapas95-Lite, [ovraer-chiapas95-lite@mimdo.eco.utexas.edu], "EZLN Communique to Italians and
Europeans in Struggle, Sep 13 (fwd)," in Chiapas95-Lite, [chiapas95-lite@mundo.eco.utexas.edu], 24
September 1997.
111
Andres Oppenheimer, "A Lawrence of Arabia for the '90s," The Miami Herald, 1 August 1994, p.8A.
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others decide to be correct behavior as the means for deciding what they believe to be
correct.
113 The tendency of people, substantiated by research, is "to see an action as
more appropriate when other are doing it." 114 This is clearly demonstrated in the
Zapatistas' use of Internet listserves and other electronic message services. By addressing
their communiques to groups all over the world and publishing interactive messages from
individuals, the perception is perpetrated that people just like themselves are supporting
the Zapatistas, thereby giving social cues to others that such support is "correct
behavior."
One example is the message from a woman in Quebec, Canada, asking the "cyber
community" where to send money for Zapatista support. According to her message, she
is translating Zapatista requests for monetary support into French, and she is being asked
by large numbers of people where they should be sending their contributions and in what
form of payment. 115 The subtle image suggested, of course, is that all of Canada is
eagerly donating money, which should cue readers in other countries to do likewise.
The perception of large, international support continues to draw in supporters,
regardless of the fact that almost all the messages are generated out of Austin, Texas.
There, the National Commission for Democracy in Mexico supposedly serves as a
collection and dissemination station for the proliferation of pro-Zapatista messages (the
EZLN communiques are supposedly faxed to the NCDM from Chiapas). Despite these








Serena d'Agostino, [darin@marasuca.com], "Support from Quebec," in Chiapas-lite, [chiapas-
l@profrnexis.sar.net], 12 September 1997.
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support for [their list of demands]... including radical changes in Mexican economic
policy... since it staged a brief armed uprising in 1994."
116
3. Member Unification
Lastly, the Zapatistas require member unification and active recruitment. Using
many of the previous techniques, such as ambiguous language and emphasis on common
traits (oppression, unequal treatment from the government, poverty, exclusion from their
traditional communities), a "common enemy" is created, serving to unify the
heterogeneous group made up of varying religious faiths and bloodlines (pure Indians
versus mestizo).
This is also evident in the notable absence of religious symbols and rhetoric,
which otherwise might serve to divide the Zapatistas, made up of "Presbyterians,
Evangelicals, Jehovah's Witnesses, outcasts from San Juan Chamula," 117 as well as
followers of the Catholic Liberation Theology. In fact, they have adamantly denounced
any such affiliations ("Our EZLN has no ties with any Catholic religious authorities nor
with authorities ofany other creed" 118).
119
The Zapatista rituals also serve to unify its members. Through rituals such as
their unique decision-making organizational structure, masks, left-handed salutes, and
organizational colors, they not only create an image of a legitimate organization and
116
Akamoore, [akamoore@aol.com], "Fwd: Associated Press: Rebels Want New Constitution," in Chiapas-
lite, [chiapas-l@profinexis.sar.net], 28 August 1997.
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Marcos, "Interview, January 1, 1994: Subcomandante Marcos: On Origins," in Clarke and Ross, p.49.
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Nonetheless, political groups since 1994 have alleged that Chiapas' Bishop Ruiz has been behind the
revolt from its beginnings, even helping to arm it. The bishop and his family have been attacked violently,
with two such attacks as late as mid-November 1997. The perpetrators are believed to be from pro-
government groups within the region who blame Ruiz for fomenting the uprising, which in turn has
destabilized the local economy and has imposed additional hardship on the already destitute in Chiapas.
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cause, but also build an identity which binds the heterogeneous members together.
Boulding observed the powerful force of common public images within organizations,
strong enough to override individuals' images of their world. 120 Furthermore, this new,
unifying identity serves to minimize their differences and offers a more understandable
image of the world, particularly attracting new members from marginalized groups that
had become confused in the changing environment of the region.
The next chapter will address in much greater detail the specific symbols, rituals,
and myths that are used by the Zapatistas in the manner described thus far.






V. THE CLOUDS FORM
A. ZAPATISTA IMAGES
Using the symbolic frame, this chapter addresses the meaning of the Zapatistas'
images, rituals, myths, and culture. Understanding the importance of these is the EZLN's
main spokesman, Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vicente, nom de guerre "Subcomandante
Insurgents Marcos", who has demonstrated an unusual awareness of symbolic
presentation and the creation of image.
As a philosophy graduate student whose Masters' thesis focused on the role of
education and language in shaping and maintaining dominant ideologies, he drew heavily
on such authors as Karl Marx, Louis Althusser, Noam Chomsky, and John Searle for his
arguments. It was these influences, perhaps, that helped shape the ideology of the EZLN
and, indirectly, their campaign of symbols and words. 121 The then-Foreign Minister Jose
Angel Gurria commented in April 1995 that "Chiapas... is a place where there has not
been a shot fired in the last fifteen months... The shootings (in Chiapas) lasted ten days
only; since then the war has been a war of ink, of written word, a war on the Internet." 122
The essence, then, of the Zapatista rebellion has been a battle for the mind, a reshaping of
image, a war ofpropaganda.
121 See Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vicente [a.k.a. Subcomandante Marcos], "Filosofia y Educaci6n,"
unpublished thesis, Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mexico, 1980, for the actual text. Specifically,
Part II deals with General Concepts of an Ideological Theory (Sobre los Conceptos Generales de una
Teoria de las Ideologias), including sections on Linguistic Transformation: Motives and Theoretical
Development (Linguistica Tranformacional: Presupuestos y Desarrollos Teoricos) and Ideology as a
"Representation of the Imaginary Relation of Individuals with their Real Conditions of Existence" (La
Ideologia como "Representaci6n de la Relaci6n Imaginaria de los Individuos con sus condictiones reales de
existencia").
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The most notable symbols of the Zapatistas are Mexican Revolution hero
Emiliano Zapata (from whom they derive their name), their charismatic spokesman,
Marcos, black ski masks, the Mexican flag, the colors black and red, and, to a lesser
extent, corn and the drawings of Jose Guadalupe Posada. Death, too, is a constantly
recurring theme mentioned in their communiques, interviews, as well as other written
media. These symbols appear on their Webpages, on their banners, in their
demonstrations and marches, and on building graffiti, and in their press interviews.
Appearing in such a wide range of mediums, these symbols have meaning for the
equally wide range of audiences that are targeted. Their meanings all create an image of
the Zapatistas as a legitimate organization fighting for the rights of not only the
indigenous, but all oppressed peoples, regardless of sex or ethnicity. To Mexicans
outside Chiapas, the "reunification of indigenous consciousness at the margin has not
only revitalized national identity, it has infused it with an indigenous consciousness."
Mexicans are thus united in their common indigena heritage. Carlos Fuentes, comments
that
We have always congratulated ourselves in Mexico on our extraordinary
Indian culture which we display in museums and through imposing
monuments along our boulevards. We say we are proud of being
descendents of that culture. In actual practice, however, we have treated
the Indians with more cruelty, perhaps, than Cortez. 124
Moreover, this "indigenous consciousness" is closely tied to Mexican nationalism, and
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Suddenly, with the uprising in Chiapas, many Mexicans felt that history was
crashing down on top of them. History as a synonym for ancient arrears, old
habits of mind, even of myths deeply rooted among the people. Chiapas seemed
to embody the past—latent, unresolved, still vigorously alive. The outbreak
looked like an eruption of the lava of history. 125
The image then, or the "picture of the world the Zapatistas have been seeking to craft," 126
is one which
symbolizes injustices against 'forgotten' Mayas; failure of Salinas' efforts
to protect rural poor from structural adjustments for NAFTA, about
betrayal of the revolutionary and constitutional commitment to agrarian
life.
157
1. Zapata and Ethnicity
Perhaps the most potent symbol of the Zapatistas is that of Emiliano Zapata,
Revolutionary War hero and proponent of indigenous land rights. In addition to taking
his name for their organization, the Zapatistas use his image on the EZLN's webpage,
"Action Zapatista", and the "Chiapas Menu", as well as carry placards with his picture
during marches (See Figures 9, 10, and 11). The image of Zapata has been used to
successfully draw upon nationalism as well as the indigenous struggle for rights, and he
is described both as Indian and mestizo (largely dependent on who is describing him),
thus enabling both ethnic groups to identify with him.
This Revolutionary War leader is a symbol that is interpreted in several ways.
For non-indigenous Mexicans, he represents an indigenous revolutionary hero who
125
Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography ofPower, A History ofModern Mexico, 1810-1996, Trans, by Hank
Heifetz, HarperCollins Publishers, 1997, p.780.
126
Harry Cleaver, "Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas: A Review,"





Figure 9. Zapatista supporters protesting in Mexico City, carrying Zapata's image
on placard. From Totoro Taulis, 82.
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figure 10. January, 1994, demonstration in Mexico City in support of Zapatistas,
carrying picture of Zapata. From Katzenberger, 217.
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Figure 11. This button
appears on the EZLN
page, with the caption
"Enough is Enough!"
The EZLN Page
Figure 12. Even in death, Zapata lives on. From Womack, center
plates.
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fought for indigenous land rights. To the indigenous, he is one in a chain of ladino or
mestizo champions of indigenous rights throughout history, as well as "one of
them;"
128
a "nationalist hero of indigenous rights, a kind of post-revolutionary 'saint', a
Bartolome de las Casas of this century, with a gun." 129 For the Zapatistas, made up of the
landless and marginalized (peasants and indigenous alike), he is a symbol of a just
revolution and legitimate cause, as well as a reminder of the ultimate betrayal of the
government (his murder) (see Figure 12). Collectively, his movement is remembered
best by its notable "bias toward indigenous values and consequent respect for the
Indians,"
130
and he may even be described politically as a grass roots anarchist.
Specifically, his
unflinching stance on behalf of his people, and the fate he suffered as a
result, has converted him into something of an icon among those who feel
that Indians have been and continue to be wronged by Mexico's
postrevolutionary governments. 131
In this way, Zapata is a symbol that appeals to all Mexicans, as well as to
indigenous people outside ofthe country. By appealing to the guilt felt by Mexicans over
their past treatment of Indians, the Zapatistas exploit this vulnerability. They achieve not
only legitimization of their cause through the use of a historically legitimate figure, but
also appeal to the vulnerability of indigenous groups searching to legitimize their cause
for indigenous rights and recognition.
There is also a supernatural side to the symbol of Zapata. He is variously
believed to have escaped, to have been reincarnated, or to remain living on (in memory,
128
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at least) (refer again to Figure 12). In "La Toma de Ocosingo" ("The Taking of
Ocosingo"), a song created after the occupation of Ocosingo by the Zapatistas to describe
their victory over the army ("Los malditos soldados" or "the wicked soldiers"), there
appear the following verses at the beginning and end, "Soldados Insurgentes
son/empezaron la Revolution./...Rompimos el cercoj'y cuando salimos,
gritamos/...;Viva Zapata!" ("They are Insurgent Soldiers/who will begin the
Revolution/We have broken through the lines/and when we leave, we shout/...Zapata
lives!").
132
This allusion to a reincarnated Zapata again serves as a reminder to
Mexicans of the eventual victory of the Zapatista's cause and affords a sense of
spirituality to the rebellion, which is otherwise conspicuously absent of religious symbols
(due to the religiously diverse members of the Zapatistas themselves).
2. Marcos, Subcomandante of Performance255
Just as Zapata was considered the non-Indian (mestizo) champion of indigenous
rights (as was Fray Bartolome de las Casas; the ladino Galindo, who led the 1869
Chamula uprising; and the current bishop, Samuel Ruiz), so too is Marcos. The most
visible member and spokesman of the EZLN, he was described as "a white man, robust
but not heavy; he looks not pockmarked; he is likeable, courteous, and educated" 134 (see
Figure 13). He is a self-described product of "the gilded upper-middle-class culture of
Mexico City;" 135 approximately forty years of age; speaks fluent English, French, and a
few indigenous languages; and exudes charm, confidence, sophistication, and a sense of
132 Dauno T6toro Taulis and Emiliano Thibaut, Zapatistas, (Santiago, Chile) Libreia Liberarte, 1996, p.33.
Translated by author.
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humor. His image is modern and likeable, hardly that of a "traditional" revolutionary
fanatic and his appeal is no surprise. 136 Hence, Marcos becomes for the mostly
indigenous Zapatistas a bridge to the outside world, a contemporary ladino champion of
rural and indigenous causes in the tradition of de las Casas, Galindo, and Zapata.
Worthy of a student of Althusser and a former teacher of graphic design and
communications, Marcos is also adept at managing symbolic language and shaping
images. Owing to this, he has shaped his own "dazzling image as a masked mito genial,
his own term for an inspired act of mythmaking." 137 His carefully crafted image is a
synthesis of twentieth century symbols, costumes, and props, all designed to evoke a
litany of required responses if the Zapatistas are to be successful (see Figures 13 and 14).
The constant "bulldog" pipe and sex appeal are reminiscent of both Zapata, who refused
to abandon his ever-present cigar even in the thick of battle, 138 and Che Guevara. The
Zapata-style bandoleers are loaded with bullets that do not match the AR-15 assault rifle
he carries, and the Mao-style cap with three red stars across the front complete the image
of, as the New York Times christened him, "the first postmodern guerrilla leader" 139 (this
may not hold true, perhaps, upon closer examination). His eroticism, just as legendary
as Zapata's "way with women," is as crucial to his image. "His soft and sincere voice,
and 'beautiful hazel eyes' framed by the black mask, turned him into an icon of forbidden
136 Marcos was also a volunteer worker in Sandinista Nicaragua and since 1983 was a member of the Front
for National Liberation (FLN). In the early 1980s, the FLN's published aim was to set up a "dictatorship of
the proletariat" using a strategy of "initiating the struggle in those places where "irredentist" masses are
ready to take up arms, making use of the geographic evaluations duly assessed by our commanders."
Irredentism, defined as "a defiance of the center by a group with a strong sense of its own ethnicity and
grievances," reigned in Chiapas. Taken from Kreuze, p.784.
137
Guillermoprieto, "The Unmasking," p. 42.
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Figure 13. Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos. From Tootoro Taulis, center
plates between 82 and 83.
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Figure 14. Marcos and members of the EZLN in Chiapas. From Totoro Taulis,





and women from all walks of life threw themselves at his feet. A cult
following quickly developed, and a torrent of T-shirts, key chains, dolls, posters, and
even ski-masked condoms (see Figure 15), soon descended upon Mexico. 141
Denying his role as Zapatista leader, he asserted instead that he was subordinate
to a collective indigenous committee, from which he received his orders. This, coupled
with his appropriation of Zapata and other historical symbols, achieves two key ends.
First, it gives the impression that the "oldest inhabitants of the continent are directing the
rebellion."
142
Second, by "anchoring his struggle in Mexican history," 143 he extends the
appeal of the movement to the non-indigenous Mexicans, and reaches out to values that
shape their image of the world. "Right from the beginning, he said that the Zapatistas
were 'heirs to the true forgers of our nationality.' All they wanted was that there should
be 'democracy, that there should not be inequality,' deliverance as God speaks of it." 144
Even the current goal of regional autonomy is seemingly lifted from the pages of history:
"the dream of Zapatista [circa 1910] redemption was to create a mosaic of small
autonomous holdings whose owners would be united by a strong sense of community." 145
3. Masks
Although not taken from history, another readily identifiable symbol associated

















Figure 15. "Say NO to terrorism. Use Marcocondoms against AIDS."
(author's trans.) Advertisement which appeared in Chahuistle, no.l, a
Mexico City weekly magazine. From Katzenberger, 97.
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they announced that their use of masks (worn only by the commanders) (refer again to
Figure 14) was to act "as a safeguard against caudillismo,"
146
"guarding against stardom,
that is, to make sure that no one is promoted over others." 147 This is much the same as
Laba observes regarding the lack of focus on personality and leaders within the Polish
Solidarity movement.
148 Marcos himself, however, seemingly contradicts this through
his use of other distinguishing props such as his pipe and cap.
Marcos further describes the mask as an anonymous symbol of their collective
leadership, unrelated to the individual wearing it.
Now you're listening to me because I'm here but elsewhere there are other
people like me talking with ski masks on. They call this ski mask
"Marcos" here today and tomorrow they'll call it "Pedro" in Magaritas or
"Joshua" in Ocasingo or "Alfredo" in Altamirano or whatever they may
call it.
149
The "it" to which he refers is "a collective heart, not a caudillo," 150 using the mask to
personify and simplify the concept of collective leadership, as Kertzer noted. 151 In fact,
one anthropologist observed that one of the most notable features about the rebellion is
that "it is not characterized by personal charisma which is almost invariably found in
Mexican politics, governmental as well as rebellious."
The masks, therefore, help perpetrate an image they have crafted of themselves
that they hope to convince others to accept. "The only image that you're going to have is
146 EZLN, "Communique, January 6, 1994: Dying, But Now to Live," in Clarke and Ross, p.53.
47
Marcos, "Interview, January 1, 1994: Subcomandante Marcos: On Origins," in Clarke and Ross, p.45.
148 Roman Laba, The Roots ofSolidarity, Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 149.
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that those revolutionaries here are masked." 153 During an interview with Meada
Benjamin, Marcos responds to questions regarding unmasking:
I will take offmy ski mask when Mexican society takes off its own mask,
the one it uses to cover up the real Mexico. Then Mexicans would see that
the self-image they have been sold is false, mat the reality of Mexico is
much more terrible than they'd ever imagined. And once they have seen
the real Mexico—as we have seen it—they will be more determined to
i • 154
change it.
The masks are also symbols also ofthe "faceless and voiceless" 155 of Chiapas, and
of the Mexican "culture of veils." 156 Returning to the idea of the "true" image held by the
Zapatistas, Marcos is certain that "civil society will scarcely wake from the long and lazy
dream that 'modernity' foisted on it at the cost of everything and everyone." 157 The use of
this symbol is perhaps most useful as a ritual act to unify the Zapatistas themselves.
4. Flags
The flag of the EZLN is not as prominently displayed as the Mexican tricolor (see
Figure 16). Either the Mexican flag or its colors are what appears on their numerous
websites, publications, and during their activities. The Mexican flag, according to the
Zapatistas, symbolizes the fact that the Mexican people are on their side, and the
Homeland and flag are both "loved and respected by all the insurgent combatants."
They declare that they "are using the colors of red and black on our uniform, symbols of
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155 EZLN, "Communique, February 26, 1994," as quoted in Ronald Nigh, "Zapata Rose in 1994: The Indian
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Figure 16. Carrying the tricolor during a movement
in Chiapas. Photos from "Chiapas" World Wide Web
page, [http://www.grin.net/~dcearley/].
1S8 EZLN, "Communique, January 2, 1994: Declaration of War of the Zapatista National Liberation Army,"
in Clarke and Ross, p.36.
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...and we will always take this flag into our battles" 159 (see Figure 17). For the ancient
Maya, the colors red and black were associated with the directions east (or south, for the
highland nations of Mexico) and west. 160 Black is typically associated with death, central
in Mexican culture, and the black of "mourning and penitence is also a promise of future
resurrection."
161 Red is also thought of as "the color of aggression, vitality, and strength,
associated with fire and symbolizing both love and mortal combat." 162 In ancient
Mexican art, this color was used sparingly, saved for the illustrating blood, fire, the sun,
or leather. Additionally, in Renaissance heraldry, red symbolized "a burning desire for
virtue" and a "devout heart, ready to shed its blood for the word of God," while black
represented "sorrow, humility, misfortune, and danger." All the suggested meanings of
the EZLN colors together support their image, both public and private. The most
compelling meaning, though, is that of Mexican nationalism — a means again of linking
the Zapatistas to the legitimate image of the Mexican nation, a part of the Mexican
image, not apart. In this way, support can be raised within the country. Referring back
to Figure 9, the red and black of the placard of Zapata are also apparent on the EZLN
emblem in Figure 11, and the masked EZLN members in Figure 14 are also brightly
attired in red bandanas and black masks.
5. Corn
Although not as often as Zapata, Marcos, or masks, corn shows up many times in
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Figure 17. EZLN banner displayed. From "Zapatismo




an important role and is closely tethered to the concepts of identity for both groups. The
fear that corn from the United States would replace domestically produced corn was
extended to include fear that the US would erase Mexican identity. Exploiting this fear
as well as using it as an identifying symbol of Mexican and Mayan identity are two
reasons for the use of this particular symbol. Figures 18 and 19 show two examples in
which corn appears as part of the Zapatistas portrayed in the artwork, one was from
graffiti on a wall in Chiapas and the other was part of the "Chiapas" website.
6. Posada
Zapata is not the only Revolutionary War symbol used in Zapatista propaganda.
Jose Guadalupe Posada was that war's greatest artist. Known as the precursor of black
humor, his drawings of skeleton figures, skulls, and comic verse were used to voice
opposition to the regime of Porfirio Diaz. Figure 20 showcases several of his figures, all
of which appear on Zapatista or EZLN webpages. His art was a popular tool for
informing Mexicans across the country of the "foibles and corruption of the Porfiriato."
It is in based on this historical context that his work is used today by the Zapatistas to
illustrate what they feel to be the "foibles and corruption" of the Mexican government.
The Zapatista skull used on their websites and commonly attributed to Posada, however,
is reputed to actually be the work ofManuel Manilla, his teacher. 164
164
"Algunas calaveras famosas que se atxibuyen a Posada, como la 'calavera Zapatista' son en reaiidad obra
de Manilla," trans, by author. Fernando Flores Alvarado, "Jos£ Guadalupe Posada: de Posada y Su




Figure 18. Graffiti in Chiapas. Photo from personal collection of Major A. Sanchez,
U.S. Army.
Figure 19. Rendering of
Zapatista. From Chiapas





Figure 20. Various Posada figures which appear on EZLN's "Accion
Zapatista" World Wide Web page,
[http://www.utexas.edu/students/nave/olinks.html].
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7. Death in Mexico
Posada's macabre artwork and its popularity are related to a "traditional Mexican
reverence for death and the exaltation ofmartyrdom."
165 Drawing upon this fascination,
Zapatista communiques are liberally sprinkled with references to death and the dead, so
much so that Fidel Castro criticized Marcos for "[talking] a lot about war and death," 166
by which he seemed to target a suicidal non-political aspect of the movement.
Discussing the government's failure to officially record the high numbers of indigenous
deaths due to sickness and poor health conditions in Chiapas, he writes that "[t]he old
men say that the wind, the rain and the sun are speaking in a different way, that with so
much poverty, one cannot continue harvesting death, that it is the hour to harvest
rebellion." In this way, he successfully synthesizes the symbols of indigenous values,
and an implied ancestral consent.
Yet another communique of the EZLN reinforces this image of approval from the
community elders, the "true guardians of the words of our dead ancestors," 168 with such
passages as:
The world is another world, reason no longer governs and we true men
and women are few and forgotten and death walks upon us, we are
despised, we are small, our word is muffled, silence has inhabited our
houses for a long time, the time has come to speak for our hearts, for the
hearts of others, from the night and from the earth our dead should come,
the faceless ones, those who are jungle, who dress with war so their voice
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The Zapatistas have said that "they have chosen 'to give death back its
1 7fl
meaning'," and their possible martyrdom appears to not only be sanctioned by their
own value system, but appeals to Mexicans outside Chiapas. Zapata himself is viewed as
an uncorrupted hero and martyr, sacrificed in not only the name of indigenous rights, but
justice as well. "Receive our blood, brothers and sisters, so that so much death won't be
in vain, so that truth might return to our land," 171 and "Courage came, bravery came to us
from the mouth of our greatest dead, yet now alive again in our dignity which they gave
us...we saw that we had to win a dignified death so that everyone would live, one day,
with good and with reason," are only a few examples of the images conjured up to
reinforce this idea.
Death, however, is as close as the Zapatistas venture into the realm of religious
symbolism, although they do ground their rebellion spiritually. Both the "resurrection" of
Zapata and Fray de las Casas, whose "spirit seemed to have slipped across the centuries
1 73
to take form again in the figure of Don Samuel Ruiz," allude to a supernatural force
strengthening the Zapatistas. Figure 21 depicts Bishop Ruiz, who plays a prominent role
in any discussion ofthe Zapatistas.
In contrast to Zapata's guerrillas, specific religious symbols and causes that might
have been used to justify the rebellion are conspicuously absent. Owing to the
religiously-persecuted members of the Zapatistas, it makes perfect sense that they would
build an "inclusive movement in part by disavowing religious affiliation while affirming
170
Krauze, p.793.
171 EZLN, "Communique, February 16, 1994," in Clarke and Ross, p.79.
172 EZLN, "Communique, February 1, 1994," in Clarke and Ross, p.65.
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religious tolerance, epitomizing an ecumenism that has since become more prominent
even in Bishop Ruiz's church efforts." 174
8. Language
Language and the manner in which appeals are framed have also been critical
methods of gaining support for the Zapatistas' campaign. The simple, comprehensible,
and clear moral basis of their discourse has provided an "antithesis of the language used
by the government." 175 By simplifying a complex world, their image then becomes much
easier to accept. This ability of Marcos, as well as of other leaders of the EZLN, to
clarify and to eloquently articulate the complex world in which people find themselves
has had wide appeal, reaching both the indigenous as well as those outside Chiapas.
Owing to his prolific essays, letters, and interviews, Marcos is the most visible as
well as the most effective representative (see Figure 22). One journalist describes his
style thusly:
Now swaggering, now full of righteous fury, now impudent and hip, the
Marcos of the postscripts is at all times both elusive and intimate, and this
seductive knack has allowed him to become a faceless stand-in for all the
oppressed, an anonymous vessel for all fantasies from the sexual to the
bellicose, a star.
176
In this way, the Zapatista image is crafted to reach and be readily accepted by a much
larger audience than exists in Chiapas.
Humor, too, has contributed to the successful packaging of the Zapatista image,
securing for the rebels a huge popularity among the Mexicans. Humor, according to one
analyst, is specific to spontaneous rebellion movements and is, usually, "quite absent






Figure 22. Marcos reading one of his letters to the press. La Jornada has been
the most cooperative in printing his letters and responses, as well as exclusive
interviews. From Totoro Taulis, center plates between 146 and 147.
176
Guillermoprieto, "The Unmasking," p.42.
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from well-organized uprisings, where we often find a pompous and self-conscious
vocabulary which tends to alienate potential sympathizers and supporters." 177
When asked why he wears a mask, for example, Marcos replied that "the
members ofthe rebellion hide their heads "so that the better looking ofthem would not
have an unfair advantage over the others." 178 After his identity was revealed, he then
asked, "So... Is this new Subcomandante Marcos [referring to the true identity of
"Marcos"] good-looking? Because lately they've been assigning me [alluding to the
previous attempts at unveiling the true identity of Marcos] really ugly ones and my
feminine correspondence gets ruined." 179 And when the former (and allegedly brutal)
Governor of Chiapas, General Absalon Castellanos Dominguez, was tried in abstentia at
the Zapatista revolutionary court, he was sentenced to "a life-time's manual labor in an
indigenous community in Chaipas." 180
Equally as humorous are Marcos' children's stories about the exploits of Durito,
the tobacco-stealing beetle. He created these stories in response to drawings from a little
girl and he has used the ongoing saga of Durito to vocalize to Mexican society his
arguments against the evils of neoliberalism (well received in this particular format) (see
Figure 23).
The Zapatistas, by using Marcos as a means of identifying with those outside of
Chiapas, have in this way been able to secure for themselves "a benevolent support from











Figure 23. Durito is a series of children's stories Marcos wrote about a beetle that
stole his tobacco. The series is used to illustrate the "evils" of neo-liberalism. From




feat which might also prove to be very important in the ensuing discussion in Mexican
society."
181 The most important feature, however, of the Zapatista's use of language is its
"dexterity at converting military demands into social demands, to move from a position
ofarmed struggle to political opposition." 182
B. RITUALS AND MYTHS OF THE ZAPATISTAS
Just as several Zapatista symbols have served to unify, rituals too draw groups
together. The importance of such rituals is magnified, however, given the heterogeneous
composition of the Zapatistas. Myths, which Edelman defined as common beliefs of a
large group of people, give meaning to events and actions. There are many rituals and
myths used by the Zapatistas, from the seemingly unimportant to the more far-reaching,
all of which serve to bind the organization together and reaffirm their images of both
themselves and the world.
One of the earliest rituals noted was the fact that the rebels saluted the Mexican
flag with their left hand (see Figures 24 and 25). Seeming at first irreverent, it soon took
on a different meaning as it came to light that this was done in memory of a revered
former leader. Their left-handed comrade, part of the original group that arrived with
Marcos in 1983, was killed during the early years in a training accident
183
and is
memorialized by this ritual.
To further link their rebellion to the Maya tradition, spiritual ritual was also
incorporated, thus increasing legitimization of the organization for the Maya members as








Figure 24. Marcos saluting with his left hand in honor of his fallen comrade. From "Fotos de
Frita Hartz" World Wide Web page, [http://serpiente.dgsca.unam.mx/jornada/foto/paginal.html].
Figure 25. EZLN members saluting with their left hands in Chiapas. From The Editorial
Collective, jZapatistas! Documents of the New Mexican Revolution, Autonomedia, 1994, p.168.
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Maya groups of Chiapas constructed a sacred shrine atop the Temple of the Inscriptions
at Palenque, within which Lord Pacal was entombed. Burning incense and candles, they
prayed to Lord Pacal for peace. Then they announced that the Fifth Sun, characterized by
hunger and disease, had ended and the Sixth Sun had begun, signaling the dawning of an
era ofhope and unity for the indigenous people. 184
The rituals just described were real, just as the drama ofZapatismo exists. But, as
in all dramas, "there are also actors within it who consciously and unconsciously have
taken on roles." Marcos, the self-described mito genial, has both shaped and directed this
drama. Krauze sums it up best, announcing the cast of players:
The Indians... are real Indians, but they "represent" all the Indians of
Mexico, supposedly "exploited for five hundred years." Samuel Ruiz is a
dedicated man with faith in the possibility of justice, but he is also "the
new las Casas." The Dominicans and their "catechists" are genuine
soldiers of that same faith, but onstage they are the new missionaries who
"sting" with their militant consciousness. And there is Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos. His commitment to altering the social reality of
Chiapas and Mexico is authentic (his democratic convictions less certain).
He has been in the jungle with the Indians since 1983. It is a real and
some would say admirable life choice. But his specific role as leading
man is less clear.
185
The cast of characters in the Zapatista drama is thus scrolled across the screen.
The mythmaker has shaped his image, and must now sell it to the rest of the world. He
does this using the props described in this chapter, creating a final product that is hard to
resist:
Marcos has been trying to make history—to compose it
—
through a
deliberate theatrical use of the sacred scripture of Mexican history. He
portrays himself and his followers as the legitimate heirs of all the just
wars in the history of Mexico, the struggle against slavery, the War of






the American invaders...And against his Zapatistas, trailing back through
history, he arrays all the standard villains and fuses them together... The
centuries are summoned up to compose a mythical drama, a morality play
of heroism and redemption, no longer an internationalist Marxist tableau




VI. THE RAIN FALLS: CONCLUSION
A. FINAL ANALYSIS
1. Target Audience Selection
The Zapatistas took advantage of the economic and social upheaval (the
conditions of which contributed to the formation of such an organization), which in turn
created divisions within the region. Using the fine art of persuasion, they simply
identified the weak spots in the images held by these displaced and marginalized groups
and pried them apart with cleverly crafted symbolic messages. Exploiting their loss of
identity and feelings of abandonment by the government, the Zapatistas were there to
provide not only a new identity, but also legitimization and hope for a better life. After
all, what more had they to lose?
Using symbols, rituals, and myths that represented this new identity and linking
their cause to history, they built a unified organization out of several different subgroups.
With the support of other groups outside the region and the sense of continuing struggle
begun by Zapata and other heroes (and perhaps still guided spiritually by them), the
belief that victory will ultimately prevail on their side is carried as a banner of hope.
Most importantly in unifying this group, however, is the emphasis on shared history and
identity, minimizing their differences (religion, ethnicity) while highlighting their
commonalities (economic strife and social/political exclusion). In this way, the EZLN
maintains support and members within Chiapas.
Outside of the region, the Zapatistas have provided a better image of the world
and society, an image that the scandal-weary and economically depressed Mexicans have
93
been only too willing to accept. Just as with the poor and indigenous within Chiapas,
what did they have to lose by supporting a group promising justice and sensible reform,
led by a likeable person with whom they could identify? Cialidini's principle of liking,
also known as the "Friendly Thief principle, is particularly appropriate. Their use of the
news media, incorporating personal letter, humor and exclusive interviews serves them
particularly well in this endeavor. Equally as successful was the Zapatista appeal to
Mexican society's belief (or vanity) in a glorious and righteous history. Perhaps their
greatest stroke of brilliance was the appropriation of Emiliano Zapata as a symbol of the
equally glorious and righteous (by association) Zapatista cause. In this way, because the
Zapatista image of the world coincides with the Mexican's view of what they would like,
the image is more readily accepted.
Similarly, the figure of Marcos as a ladino sacrificing for the rights of Indians and
peasants (as did Zapata) allowed Mexicans to atone for their collective sin of ignoring
these people by supporting Marcos and his Zapatistas. With images of the poorly armed
(e.g., wooden weapons) Indians fighting for basic rights enjoyed by the rest of Mexican
society, this then becomes an extension of Edelman's suggestion that leaders serve to
assuage "personal guilt and anxiety by transferring responsibility to another." 187
Along the same lines of societal sins, the Zapatista appeal to activist groups
around the world ignites a flame of righteousness. Groups are outraged at alleged
incidents of human rights abuses, violence against women, and the oppression of Indians.
The result of targeting these groups, of course, is the perception of wide global support,




social proof and commitment/consistency help explain this rapid spread of perceived
support, at least on the Internet. Another important effect is the restraint on the
government, forced to negotiate rather than subdue the insurgents, all done under the
scrutiny of a global audience.
2. Dissemination Means
To best sell their image and cause, thereby gaining legitimacy and support, the
Zapatistas have chosen the Internet and the public media as their primary means of
spreading their messages based on their target audiences. Because messages are so
quickly and widely spread, as well as the demonstrated ease of disseminating exaggerated
and unverifiable stories, the Internet has become one of the favorite mediums of the
Zapatistas. The press is also a favorite, for its more personal aspects (letters to the
editors, photos, credibility as news source) as well as credibility (The New York Times is
recognized by many to be more legitimate news source than, say, "The Zap Net of
Autonomy" website). Additionally, the local news in Mexico City is more effective at
reaching the potential target audiences there than the Internet, while the Internet is the
means of choice for activists the world over (the exaggerated stories are particularly
effective at rousing support from these areas).
3. Overall Results
Overall, their campaign has targeted the three most viable audiences with
effective symbols that engender the desired responses. They have achieved a certain
level of legitimacy due largely to the emphasis on the existing conditions within the
region and the government's failure to remedy the situation. The forgotten and "faceless"
voices of Chiapas have brought their issues effectively into the light of day, with a little
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help from a masked Marcos, and their rebellion has increased pressures on Mexico's
leaders to "continue enacting political and electoral reform, and to take human rights
seriously."
188 By "transforming civil society and setting the agenda toward social
change"
189
within Mexico, they have also focused attention on similar movements and
causes in other countries, although to a lesser extent. This has led to grass roots support
in not only Chiapas and Mexico, but from activist groups internationally. In this way,
then, their efforts have been successful.
On the other hand, there are several inconsistencies in their messages and actions.
The messages and images they have built focus on an organization composed of
marginalized citizens, firing bullets rather than words in their struggle for basic rights
afforded the rest of the country's citizenry. Despite their appeal for reform within the
legal framework of the constitution and negotiations (rather than a violent overthrow of
the existing government and its structure), they denounced the 1997 elections. They
explained that none of the candidates sufficiently addressed their issues, and showed
themselves "to be indifferent toward the considerations of [the Zapatistas]." 190
Additionally, the Zapatistas emphasize their requests for basic rights and services
from the government, while calling much less attention to their creation of autonomous
municipalities in the region.
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autonomous municipality named "Ernesto 'Che' Guevara," there are nearly 40 operating
rebel municipalities in Chiapas. Although the Zapatistas claim their creation of such
municipalities and other integrated autonomous zones are based on "national and
international treaties regarding autonomy, as well as Convention 169 of the International
Labor Organization," the government condemns their creation as further provocation and
without legal recognition.
These actions and inconsistencies can erode their public support. This would be
the case, particularly if they begin to resort to increasingly violent and offensive acts
against non-military government officials or even civilians in an attempt to put
themselves on the front pages of the newspapers and into national consciousness. By
stepping outside their image of a justified cause that has gained some legitimacy, they
would cease to fit the society's image of their Mexican heroes, as well as would erode the
"likeability" of their charismatic spokesman, Marcos. Additionally, rumored support
from foreign insurgent groups, such as the ETA, will further alienate Mexican civil
society. The Zapatistas would cease to be "one of them", becoming instead just another
insurgent group.
Recently, they have attempted to jump back into the headlines through peaceful
means. They attended the "Second Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against
Neo-liberalism" in Spain, 193 formed a political front for their organization, 194 and
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conducted a peaceful march into Mexico City. In the capital, they demanded the
immediate implementation of the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture
(result of their negotiations in August 1994), and resumption of their dialogues, which
several officials and the leader of one political party stated support for continued talks.
195
As Collier succinctly commented, "the PRD victory in the Mexico City mayoralty
elections stole center stage from the Zapatistas in Mexican public view...now [they] need
to recapture attention center stage, and the march and the demands for institution of the
autonomy accords are what they hope will do it."
1
But, since the talks have yet to resume, their initial demands have not been met,
NAFTA continues, and they are not the only headlines in today's newspapers, the
question remains of whether they won the war of words. During an interview, Marcos
responded to the following: "The spark of your offensive didn't catch fire. It didn't turn
into an insurrection. The people didn't put up barricades, rise up in the city." According
to him, that was not their expectation, rather they saw "the armed struggle as part of a
larger, more complex process, a part which could come to be determinant... its validity is
demonstrated by that sudden attention to the indigenous question on the part of the
Federal government."
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If, however, they have redefined their definition of success to mean only keeping
reform issues at the forefront of society's consciousness, then they have triumphed, at
least at the level of society in general. This is evidenced by the current enactment of
political and electoral reforms, emphasis on human rights, and setting the agenda toward
social change. Thus, the real determinants will be the continuation of these reforms at the
lower levels of society, to include the more specific issues of public services and land
within Chiapas. Nevertheless, viewing the Zapatista rebellion through the symbolic
frame, in terms of the target audiences and means of message dissemination, the
Zapatistas were successful and achieved their immediate goals of legitimacy, member
unification, and support (even if only tacit). Currently at a crossroads, however, they
must now choose a path, be it political or military, both of which will require a new
strategy of symbols.
Finally, the importance of selecting appropriate symbols and shaping messages in
order to reach target audiences and garner support was best evidenced by the Zapatistas'
initial emphasis on their campesino (peasant) identity and the common struggle for land
rights. After the reaction by the international audiences and the media's focus on the
indigenous component of the movement, the Zapatistas then began to more fully embrace
the indigenous agenda and played down their "passe rhetoric of socialist revolution." 198
Understanding that member unification of the ethnically diverse groups was critical in the
earliest stages of the organization's development, it was logical that the EZLN would
avoid ethnic rhetoric due to the potentially divisive effects of such language. After
solidifying their membership base, however, the attention generated by the Indian factor
198 Van Cott, p.74.
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persuaded them to change their rhetoric and emphasis. In this way, the incorporation of
the Maya of Chiapas, especially marginalized and abused by the government, gave the
Zapatistas and their "cause" credibility in the eyes of Mexicans and the global
community.
B. APPLICABILITY OF SYMBOLIC FRAME TO OTHER STORMS
The symbolic frame is an effective method for examining revolutions and
insurgencies, particularly so in this modern era of technology which makes it easier than
ever to create images. Because image is so vital to popular support, symbols play a large
role in these movements, and it is critical for the analyst to understand their effects. The
issues of legitimacy, member unification and recruitment, popular support, and
challenges to existing power structures are not specific only to the Zapatistas. Instead,
these issues are central to any other "storm" that might appear on the horizon.
Another lesson from the Zapatista case study that can be applied elsewhere
concerns their use of the Internet. They demonstrated that the Internet can be effectively
used to pass symbolic messages to a target audience, shaping their own image, as well as
raise support (both perceived and actual). The Internet, as noted in one strategic
assessment, could be "used offensively as an additional medium in psychological
operations campaigns." 199 In these terms, then, the Zapatistas have provided an example
worth examining.
Before concluding this thesis, it is necessary to point out again that, while the
symbolic frame provides a both useful and valuable perspective when examining




their role are but one facet of any such movement. To use only this perspective would
ignore the other critical aspects and motivators that, together with the symbols, provide
the analyst with the most complete understanding possible. In the case of the Zapatistas,
focusing exclusively on the ethnicity of the rebels would have left out the fundamental
economic debates that have impacted so greatly on the situation at hand. Without
examining these other areas, critical pieces of information and background would be
missed, and the resultant picture would be incomplete.
The storm, ofwhich Marcos spoke, has arrived. The sky darkened and the winds
carried in the clouds. Marcos predicted that
The prophecy is here. When the storm calms, when
Rain and fire again leave the country in peace,
The world will no longer be the world but
Something better.200
After placing the events of the Zapataistas' rebellion within a symbolic frame, it is not
clear for whom the world will be a better place, and it is not the purpose of this thesis to
make such a judgement. It is clear, however, that this type of analysis provides a deeper
and more complete understanding of insurgent means and ends, regardless of the moral
opinions of the analysts.
200
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APPENDIX A. ZAPATISTA ORIGINS
This Appendix contains a description of the origins of the Zapatistas. Beginning
with the pastoral activities and evangelical missionary work in the 1960s, there were
several Maoist guerrilla and peasant organizations begun. These influences, along with
the organizational structure they established (particularly the First Indian Congress in
1974), helped set the stage for the rise of the Zapatista organization.
Beginning in 1950, many of the disenfranchised indigenous groups (namely the
expulsados and other religiously persecuted groups, as well as the economically
desperate) fled to the less populated lowlands of the Lacandon jungle to recolonize the
land.
Most of these first settlers were Protestants who fled the hostile environment and
caciques (bosses or strongmen) of Chamula, a major municipality not far from San
Cristobal. "Inspired by their religious convictions, they formed 'cities of God' as
suggested by St. Augustine, giving them such biblical names as Jerusalen, Jerico, and
Betania."
201 Other Mexicans from the rest of the country soon followed once they heard
that land was available simply by squatting and cutting down the jungle. Additionally,
illegal Guatemalans (estimated at 100,000) joined these settlers, and also came in large
numbers (80,000 more) during the 1980s to flee the violence in their own country. By
1960 there were an estimated 5,000 inhabitants of the lowlands area, largely from the





The Lacandon jungle soon became populated with peoples from varied, yet all
marginalized groups, paving the way for future rebellion and unrest — the "perfect social
and cultural context for the slow nurturing ofwhat became the Zapatista movement."203
In the early 1960s and 1970s, there was much pastoral activity that has been
credited with early influences on the rebellious movements in the region. Lay teachers
known as catechists spread their word, influenced by Liberation Theology, to an
estimated two hundred localities. They organized base communities and encouraged
people to openly articulate economic and social demands in order to help improve their
standing in society. Many of these groups helped start the Zapatistas.204 Neither did this
trend cease during the last couple of decades. According to one priest, Loren Riebe, a
Los Angeles native who worked for twenty years in Chiapas, the Diocese of Chiapas
made a commitment in the mid-1980s to dedicate most of their activity to "a program of
empowering and training religious leaders in each of the Indian communities."
Bishop Samuel Ruiz of San Cristobal de las Casas,206 who arrived to the region in
January of 1960, is accepted as one of the major architects of the movement within
Chiapas for indigenous rights as well as a prominent advocate of Liberation Theology.
His earlier views that the poor of Chiapas were "the victims of a structural situation of
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domination"207 changed little over the years. In his Christmas, 1993, pastoral letter, he
responded to criticisms that he was "improperly appealing to public opinion outside of his
diocese." His appeals, he explained, were the only weapon he had to denounce the
"brutal suppression of civil protests, the still unresolved problems of expulsions of both
Catholics and Protestants from Chamula, expulsions now continuing for twenty years,
and — above all — torture inflicted by some members of the armed forces and other
official agencies."
209
In 1974, the state governor of Chiapas asked Bishop Ruiz to organize an
Indigenous Congress to commemorate the birth of Fray Bartolome de las Casas, defender
of indigenous rights. According to Collier, there were two purposes of the Congress.
First, the Catholic Church wanted to "give voice to the sufferings of the Indians," and
second, the government wanted to "create a more populist image after brutally repressing
the student movement of the late 1960s." The First Indigenous Congress, held at San
Cristobal de las Casas in October, 1974, was the "first official meeting of Indians not
convened for the government to tell Indians what to do," and included members from
various indigenous groups.
212 The most common heard demand: "Give us back the land












There were representatives from 327 communities, including 587 Tzeltals, 330 Tzotzils, 152 Tojolabals,




their demands for land, food, education, and health, are almost identical to those issued
by the Zapatistas in their 34-point agenda for negotiation, some twenty years later.
214
In addition to the pastoral movements beginning in the 1960s, there were other
groups attempting to influence the people of Chiapas. Maoist political organizers began
arriving in the region in the late 1960s. Two of these groups were the People's Union
{Union del Pueblo) and the Popular Politics (Politica Popular). Adhering to the Maoist
notion of "insertion among the masses," these organizers maintained low profiles, worked
directly with the peasants, and remained in the region for years.
Teachers also exerted a strong influence during this period, although they initially
concentrated on trade unions and higher wages. Later they changed their focus and
began organizing the peasantry around "non-educational issues and served as grass-roots
intellectuals for the emerging peasant organizations." The Church, losing its own
influence in the region, also began changing direction, and became more radicalized
during the same period.
All of these influences had a combined impact. As early as 1974, a thousand
Indians attacked the village of El Bosque, killing seven landowners, seizing municipal
buildings and cattle, and blocking roads. They were finally subdued when the Mexican
Army intervened.217 This trend only escalated, and the 1980s witnessed a proliferation of
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peasant organizations, many of which were strongly influenced by "ties to political
groups outside Chiapas."
One of the major groups was the Communalists of the Municipality of Venustiano
Carranza, later taking the name of the Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization (OCEZ),
which focused on obtaining land and combating indigenous repression. Another major
organization, founded in 1980, was the Emiliano Zapata National Independent Peasant
Alliance (ANCIEZ). Members of both of these organizations marched in the 10,000-
strong demonstration (the ANCIEZ alone accounted for fully one half of the
demonstrators) on October 12, 1992, the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Columbus.
They marched instead to honor five hundred years of Indian resistance, and toppled the
statue of Diego de Mazariegos, the Spanish conqueror of Chiapas.219
By the end of 1990, the peasant organizations were apparently making little
headway, although their organization and activities laid the groundwork for the EZLN.220
According to EZLN Major Marios (whom Collier interviewed), however, the Zapatistas
had clearly non-indigenous beginnings. Marcos and five of his idealist compatriots from
northern Mexico arrived in Chiapas in November 1983, during the peasant buildup, with
the intent to develop a political organization. According to Marios, the "northerners'
movement was taken over by the OCEZ and the ANCIEZ, which then split into two
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In early 1993 the ANCIEZ, supporting the armed uprising methods, went
underground, and evidence of an armed organization was discovered when two soldiers
were killed at San Isidro El Ocotal in March, 1993. Despite a letter from a government
official in Las Margaritas reporting guerrilla activity in the area, no action was taken and
two more soldiers were killed in May. During the subsequent military investigation,
000
several training camps for urban warfare were discovered. There are several possible
reasons why the government did not conduct pre-emptive strikes against the rebels prior
to 1994, despite the warning letter, military casualties, and the discovery of the training
camps. The Interior Secretary and former Chiapas governor Gonzalez Garrido responded
that
To spread this false rumor [concerning guerrilla activity in the region] will
cause serious damage to the development of the state, since it will block
domestic and foreign investment in the agricultural sector. The
government of Mexico rejects the possibility of a guerrilla force in this
southern Mexican state, or of any other group which is planning an
uprising due to the marginalization ofthe peasants and Indians.223
Among the possibilities are (1) a failure of the government to realize how large the
movement actually was, (2) a failure of the local government to convey accurate and
pertinent information to the national level, and (3) a fear that any attack by the
government or acknowledgement of such activity would damage the image Mexico was
attempting to portray to the world of a developed country, thereby adversely impacting









In a 1997 interview in Cambridge, Massachutes, Salinas adamantly denied either
any prior knowledge of "the existence of a guerrilla movement of the size and
characteristics of the one that appeared in January 1994," or that no action was taken "in
order to avoid problems with the NATA negotiations," although he did acknowledge
having been informed of the training camp discovery.225 The former commander of the
7 Military Region in Chiapas, on the other hand, asserts in an interview for El Universal
that "during the last eight months of 1993 the government of [Salinas] was negotiating
with the movement's leaders to get them to stop their actions."226 According to him, they
not only knew of the EZLN's existence, but "tried to solve the problem peacefully,
through dialogue."
The lack of government action against the rebels, however, did not by itself lead
to the success and recruitment of these organizations. During the first four years of the
EZLN, there were only 60 members. Realizing that the only way they would be able to
raise "wholehearted support by the local population" was by handing over final decision-
making authority to the population itself, the organization thus "accepted community
control ~ making the Chiapas rebellion unique." The result was the creation of the
Clandestine Indian Revolutionary Committee (CCRI), which was composed exclusively
of representatives from the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Choi, and Tojolabal indigenous groups,
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which also reflects the ethnic makeup of the EZLN itself.
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The end result of these economic, social, and political changes was a joining
together of two militant groups (the non-Indian revolutionary forces and the Indian
organizations)
with the structure, strategy, military nomenclature, and much of the
rhetoric of a Marxist armed movement, but with distinctly Indian features
as well: a consensual, community-based method of decisionmaking; a
political agenda that contains many of the substantive demands of the
nonviolent indigenous movement of Chiapas, as well as its characteristic
call for dignity, self-determination and respect for indigenous culture and
identity; and a primarily Mayan membership, a significant number of
whom speak only indigenous languages.229
229 Van Cott, p.20.
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APPENDIX B. REVOLUTIONARY WOMEN'S LAWS AND DEMANDS
OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
(These laws were first published in the official organ of the EZLN, El Despertador
Mexicano,no. J, December, 1993. These are taken in entirety from Clarke and Ross,
p.39)
In their just fight for the liberation of our people, the EZLN incorporates women into the
revolutionary struggle regardless of their race, creed, color or political affiliation,
requiring only that they share the demands of the exploited people and that they commit
to the laws and regulations of the revolution. In addition, taking into account the
situation of the woman worker in Mexico, the revolution supports their just demands for
equality and justice in the following Revolutionary Women's Law.
First: Women, regardless of their race, creed, color or political affiliation, have the right
to participate in the revolutionary struggle in a way determined by their desire and ability.
Second: Women have the right to work and receive a just salary.
Third: Women have the right to decide the number of children they will have and care
for.
Fourth: Women have the right to participate in the affairs of the community and to hold
positions of authority if they are freely and democratically elected.
Fifth: Women and their children have the right to primary attention in matters of health
and nutrition.
Sixth: Women have the right to education.
Seventh: Women have the right to choose their partner and are not to be forced into
marriage.
Eighth: Women shall not be beaten or physically mistreated by their family member or
by strangers. Rape and attempted rape will be severely punished.
Ninth: Women will be able to occupy positions of leadership in the organization and to
hold military ranks in the revolutionary armed forces.
Tenth: Women will have all the rights and obligations elaborated in the revolutionary
laws and regulations.
Ill
piie following excerpt is from list of thirty-four demands presented by the Zapatistas to
the Mexican government at the negotiating table during the sessions for Peace and
Reconciliation in Chiapas in March 1994. It is copied in entiretyfrom Clarke and Ross,
p.85)
Twenty-ninth: Demands of Indigenous Women
We, the peasant indigenous women, ask for immediate solutions to our most
urgent needs which have never been addressed by the government:
a) Birth clinics with gynecological services for peasant women to receive
necessary medical attention,
b) Child care centers for the children in the communities,
c) We ask the government to send sufficient food for the children in all the
rural communities such as: milk, com starch, rice, corn, soy, oil, beans, cheese, eggs,
sugar, soup, oatmeal, etc.,
d) That communal kitchens and dining halls be built for the children in the
communities with all the necessary facilities,
e) That corn mills and tortilla pressing machines be set up in the
communities according to the number of families in each community,
f) That we get livestock projects of chickens, rabbits, lambs, pigs, etc., with
technical assistance and veterinary support services,
g) We also ask for bakery projects with ovens and supplies,
h) We want to build artisan workshops with machinery and raw materials,
i) For our craftwork, we seek markets where we can obtain fair prices,
j) That schools be built where women can receive technical training,
k) That there be pre-school and infant care in the rural communities where
the children can enjoy themselves and grow up morally and physically healthy,
1) As women we need transportation available to move around as we need,
and to transport our supplies and products to make our projects work.
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APPENDIX C. FULL TEXT OF EZLN LETTER CLAIMING GOVERNMENT
ABUSES
(This newsgroup message was taken from Charles Swett, "Strategic Assessment: The
Internet," [http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/SWETT.html-ssi], 8 August 1997. The
message was posted from Arm the Spirit, [atsQlocust.cic.net], and was sent to the
following newsgroups: alt.politics.radical-left, soc.culture.mexican, and soc. right.human
on 14 February 1995)
Letter From the EZLN
February 11, 1995
Chiapas, Mexico
To the people of Mexico:
To the national and international press:
To the peoples of the world:
The Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee, General Command of the EZLN,
have made a call to all of our brothers and sisters of Mexico to detain this genocidal war
that the bad government is waging against us.
The federal government is acting with lies, it is carrying out a dirty war in our villages.
Yesterday around noon, 14 helicopters bombed the area around Morelia and Gamucha, as
well as shot artillery fire in the area under Zapatista control, thousands of federal soldiers
have penetrated into the interior of the jungle, via Monte Libano, Agua Azul, Santa
Lucia, La Gamucha Champes, San Agustin, Guadalupe Tepeyac and others. They are
surrounding us with death and ugliness. We, the Zapatistas, as troops and civilians, up to
this point, have done everything possible to fall back, but now we do not have any other
option except to defend ourselves and to defend our villages, thousands of civilians have
left their homes.
Brothers and sisters, the government of Ernesto Zedillo is killing us, it is killing children
it is attacking women and raping them. We ask the people of Mexico and all the pople of
the world to do something to stop this war.
Again we ask you, brothers and sisters, don't leave us alone.
We will act with dignity.
Liberty, Justice, and Democracy.
Fraternally,
The Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee, General Command of the EZLN
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